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The FDA’s Power Over 
Non-Therapeutic Uses of Drugs and 
Devices 
Patricia J. Zettler* 
Abstract 
Although we often—and rightly—think of the U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) as regulating important therapies 
for patients, the agency also can regulate non-therapeutic uses of 
drugs and devices. The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
defines drugs and devices as including not only products 
intended to address disease but also those intended to affect the 
structure or function of the body, such as cognitive 
enhancements, wrinkle removers, and recreational drugs. 
Indeed, if these broad definitions were read literally, many 
everyday consumer products—such as winter jackets intended to 
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keep wearers’ warm—may be drugs or devices. Accordingly, 
Congress, courts, and the agency itself have sought reasonable 
limits on the definitions.  
This Article critiques one limit that is sometimes offered: 
that the FDA cannot regulate certain non-therapeutic 
technologies because those technologies cannot be shown to be 
safe and effective. A careful review of the FDA’s past decisions on 
non-therapeutic uses reveals that this reasoning is descriptively 
incorrect. Further, examining the purposes of FDA oversight 
demonstrates that the agency is not necessarily normatively 
required to set an insurmountable bar for showing the safety and 
effectiveness of non-therapeutic uses. Reconsidering this 
reasoning as a limit on FDA jurisdiction is warranted at a time 
when evolutions in both policy and science are opening the door 
to a potentially diverse market of new, or newly legal, 
non-therapeutic technologies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Each fall as Halloween approaches, stories of the dangers 
of costume contact lenses—lenses that change the consumer’s 
eye color or give the appearance of, for example, cat or zombie 
eyes—saturate the media.1 News reports tell of consumers who 
have contracted serious eye infections or suffered injuries, such 
 
 1. See, e.g., Robert Preidt, Skip Costume Contact Lenses This Halloween, 
U.S. NEWS (Oct. 25, 2020), https://perma.cc/73LX-SDNY (“Halloween is risky 
enough this year with the coronavirus pandemic, so don't risk your vision as 
well by wearing costume contact lenses, the American Academy of 
Ophthalmology (AAO) says.”); Austin Williams, Woman Rushed to ER after 
Colored Contact Lenses She Bought at Store for Halloween Nearly Blind Her, 
FOX 5 WASH. D.C. (Oct. 30, 2019), https://perma.cc/YJW2-DH3P (believing that 
the FDA authorized the non-prescription lenses she purchased, the woman 
wore the lenses for a week until her eyes began to “burn, turn red, and become 
extremely sensitive to light” due to corneal infection); Phillip Yuhas, The 
Scariest Part of Halloween May Be the Costume Contact Lenses, an Eye Doctor 
Says, CONVERSATION (Oct. 28, 2019, 9:09 AM), https://perma.cc/9FLE-A5KY 
(“Poorly fitting costume lenses can cause many eye problems, including 
surface abrasions, allergic reactions and blurred vision.”); Venessa Wong, 
Those Colored Contact Lenses Can Seriously Damage Your Eyes and People 
Are Worried, BUZZFEED (Nov. 1, 2017, 5:32 PM), https://perma.cc/4MM7-
CBNY (warning individuals “of the hazards and the strong possibility of 
permanent eye damage including blindness from wearing over-the-counter 
colored contact lenses that are increasingly popular among children and teens 
who want to dress up as zombies, that are now on sale on-line and at many 
retail stores” (quoting Rebecca Seawright)). 
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as corneal tears, leading to years of medical treatment, 
surgeries, and for some, permanent damage to their vision.2 A 
common theme is that the injured consumers believed that the 
lenses were safe because they believed that the U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) had evaluated the lenses.3  
In many ways, this belief makes sense. Notwithstanding 
the fact that costume lenses have no therapeutic value—they do 
not correct sight or address disease in any way—they pose the 
same risks as contact lenses that correct the wearer’s vision and 
that are commonly understood to be devices subject to FDA 
oversight.4 Indeed, the FDA does regulate all contact lenses, 
regardless of whether they are corrective or decorative, as 
devices that require premarket authorization from the agency.5  
Decorative contact lenses, thus, help to illustrate the reach 
of FDA authority. Although discussions of FDA regulation of 
drugs and devices often—and, particularly amid the COVID-19 
pandemic, understandably—focus on the agency’s oversight of 
 
 2. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 1 (“Gaye was lucky. In most cases, an 
infection from a scraped cornea requires a corneal transplant in order to 
restore vision. In some extreme cases, permanent blindness can occur.”). 
 3. See id. (stating that many people buy such lenses from gas stations 
and costume shops that sell them illegally).  
 4. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, FDA STAFF, 
EYE CARE PROFESSIONALS, AND CONSUMERS: DECORATIVE, NON-CORRECTIVE 
CONTACT LENSES 2 (2006), https://perma.cc/C2P5-PRKP (PDF) [hereinafter 
DECORATIVE LENSES GUIDANCE]. 
 5. See 21 U.S.C. § 360j(n) (“All contact lenses shall be deemed to be 
devices . . . .”); DECORATIVE LENSES GUIDANCE, supra note 4, at 3 (“Although 
FDA had taken the position that contact lenses intended solely for decorative 
use may be regulated as cosmetics under section 201(i) of the Act, enactment 
of section 520(n) requires that all contact lenses be regulated as devices.”). 
Many of the news reports of injuries, however, appear to have involved 
decorative lenses that did not go through the required FDA premarket 
authorization process and were sold illegally without a prescription. See, e.g., 
Williams, supra note 1. For a fuller discussion of how the FDA came to 
regulate all contact lenses, see infra Part II.B. 
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important therapies,6 the FDA’s jurisdiction also can extend to 
non-therapeutic uses of drugs and devices.7 
This is generally because the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act8 (FDCA) broadly defines “drugs”9 and “devices” to 
include not only products intended to address disease, but also 
products “intended to affect the structure or any function of the 
body.”10 Consistent with this statutory language, the FDA’s 
drug and device authorities have been applied to a wide range 
of non-therapeutic technologies including products intended to 
enhance the cognitive or athletic performance of healthy 
individuals, breast implants for aesthetic augmentation, and 
 
 6. For example, the long-standing debate about terminally and seriously 
ill patients’ pre-approval access to experimental interventions focuses not just 
on the FDA’s role in regulating therapeutic products, but on that role in the 
context of therapeutic products intended for very sick patients who lack good 
treatment options. See, e.g., Lewis A. Grossman, AIDS Activists, FDA 
Regulation, and the Amendment of America’s Drug Constitution, 42 AM. J.L. & 
MED. 687, 721 (2016); cf. Barbara J. Evans & Ellen Wright Clayton, Deadly 
Delay: The FDA’s Role in America’s Covid-Testing Debacle, 130 YALE L.J.F. 78, 
78 79 (2020) (analyzing the FDA’s role in regulating COVID-19 testing). 
 7. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Dresser, Wendy E. Wagner & Paul C. Giannelli, 
Breast Implants Revisited: Beyond Science on Trial, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 705, 709 
(noting that “in roughly 80 percent of cases” silicone breast implants are used 
solely for aesthetic purposes). 
 8. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 
1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 399i). 
 9. Certain products that are drugs under the FDCA—including 
vaccines, viruses, proteins, therapeutic serums, and analogous products—also 
meet the definition of a “biological product” under the Public Health Service 
Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 262(i); Public Health Services Act, Pub. L. No. 78 410, 58 
Stat. 682 (1944) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 201 300mm-61). For 
example, gene therapies are both biological products and drugs. Although 
biological drug products and traditional small molecule drugs can pose 
different regulatory problems, the differences are not relevant for this Article, 
and, importantly, the FDA generally expects both kinds of products to satisfy 
the same “safe and effective” standard for premarket authorization. See 42 
U.S.C. § 262(a)(2)(C); FDA 101: Regulating Biological Products, U.S. FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN., https://perma.cc/N2XJ-GVJT (PDF) (last updated July 25, 
2008). For simplicity, therefore, this Article uses the term “drug” to include 
both traditional small molecule drugs and biological products, focusing its 
discussion on the language in the FDCA.  
 10. 21 U.S.C. § 321(g) (h).  
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drugs intended for recreational use.11 At the same time, the 
expansive language of the drug and device definitions in the 
FDCA poses a line-drawing problem. As Justice Breyer wrote in 
his dissenting opinion in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corporation,12 if the text of the definitions were “taken literally,” 
the FDA could be authorized to regulate many everyday 
consumer products that are intended to affect the structure or 
function of the body, “includ[ing] everything from room air 
conditioners to thermal pajamas.”13  
Almost certainly, there is widespread agreement that the 
FDA cannot, and should not, regulate products like thermal 
pajamas.14 But the question remains of where the precise 
boundaries of the drug and device definitions lie, and that 
question may become increasingly important as new, or newly 
legal, markets of non-therapeutic products, such as adult-use 
cannabis, emerge and potentially intersect with FDA 
jurisdiction.15 At times, Congress has stepped in to answer such 
 
 11. See, e.g., United States v. Travia, 180 F. Supp. 2d 115, 119 (D.D.C. 
2001); Warning Letter from Michael Dutcher, Dir., FDA Minneapolis Dist., to 
Timothy Meyer, ALV Supplement Direct (Mar. 3, 2016), https://perma.cc
/KFU6-SSGG; Regulatory History of Breast Implants in the U.S., U.S. FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN. (Feb. 8, 2019), https://perma.cc/5E99-GVZM (PDF). 
 12. 529 U.S. 120 (2000). 
 13. Id. at 168 (Breyer, J., dissenting); cf. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. 
GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 56 (2012) (“The 
words of a governing text are of paramount concern . . . .”). 
 14. Cf.  Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 168 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (“[It] may well be right that the statute should not be read to cover 
room air conditioners and winter underwear.”). But cf. Lars Noah, Time to Bite 
the Bullet?: How an Emboldened FDA Could Take Aim at the Firearms 
Industry, 53 CONN. L. REV. (forthcoming June 2021) (manuscript at i) ([T]he 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) could try to use its ‘device’ 
authority to rein in companies that manufacture firearms”). 
 15. See, e.g., Sam Kamin, Legal Cannabis in the U.S.: Not Whether but 
How?, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 617, 623 (2016) (describing states’ adult-use 
cannabis initiatives); see also NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., HUMAN 
GENOME EDITING: SCIENCE, ETHICS, AND GOVERNANCE 137 (2017) (describing 
the potential enhancement uses of genome editing technologies); Antonio 
Regalado, Elon Musk’s Neuralink Is Neuroscience Theater, MIT TECH. REV. 
(Aug. 30, 2020), https://perma.cc/TYS7-6LA4 (quoting Elon Musk as 
describing the neurotechnology being developed by his company, Neuralink, 
as a “Fitbit in your skull”); cf. Alexis Lazzeri, California Cannabis Regulations 
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definitional questions by amending the FDCA for specific 
technologies, as it did in 2005 when it specified that all contact 
lenses, whether decorative or corrective, are devices.16 In many 
instances, however, the agency and courts are left to determine 
the boundaries of the definitions. One argument that has been 
a powerful tool for limiting the reach of the definitions—
including in the Supreme Court majority opinion’s analysis of 
FDA authority to regulate tobacco products as drug-delivery 
devices in Brown & Williamson—is that the FDA cannot 
regulate certain non-therapeutic technologies as drugs and 
devices because it would be impossible for those technologies to 
meet the FDCA’s safety and effectiveness standards for 
premarket authorization.17  
This Article calls for skepticism about, if not the demise of, 
that line of reasoning for at least two reasons. First, for better 
or worse,18 the FDA currently possesses, and has exercised, 
tremendous flexibility in how it interprets and implements its 
premarket authorization authorities. Consistent with this 
flexibility, a careful review of past FDA actions on 
non-therapeutic uses of drugs and devices reveals that FDA 
premarket authorization processes are not an insurmountable 
 
and the Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act: A Product Liability Perspective of 
Edible Cannabis, 16 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 65, 73 74 (2020) (arguing that FDA 
could regulate cannabis edibles, whether intended for medical or adult use, 
under its food authorities). 
 16. See 21 U.S.C. § 360j(n); DECORATIVE LENSES GUIDANCE, supra note 4, 
at 3. 
 17. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 143; see also 
Whether the Food and Drug Administration Has Jurisdiction over Articles 
Intended for Use in Lawful Executions, 43 Op. O.L.C. 1, 1 2 (2019) 
[hereinafter 2019 OLC Memo], https://perma.cc/HU3J-ZW83 (concluding that 
substances used in executions are within FDA jurisdiction partly because FDA 
regulation “would effectively require their prohibition”). For the statutory 
standards related to safety and effectiveness, see, for example, 21 U.S.C. 
§ 355(d); id. § 360c(f)(2); id. § 360c(i); id. § 360e(d); 42 U.S.C. § 262(a). 
 18. Cf. Joshua D. Wallach, Joseph S. Ross & Huseyin Naci, The US Food 
and Drug Administration’s Expedited Approval Programs: Evidentiary 
Standards, Regulatory Trade-offs, and Potential Improvements, 15 CLINICAL 
TRIALS 219, 220 (2018) (assessing potential problems with “flexible approval 
standards”). 
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obstacle to marketing.19 Returning to the example of decorative 
contact lenses, they, like corrective lenses, are associated with 
serious (albeit relatively rare) risks like blindness, and 
transient, purely aesthetic, and undoubtedly to some, trivial, 
benefits.20 Nevertheless, they have received FDA authorization. 
Second, considering the purposes of FDA premarket 
authorization, including both protecting the public from 
harmful or ineffective products and forcing the development of 
information needed to understand the effects of drugs and 
devices,21 the conclusion that the FDA cannot determine 
 
 19. See infra Part III.B.  
 20. See DECORATIVE LENSES GUIDANCE, supra note 4, at 2 (enumerating 
the risks of decorative lenses including blindness, infection, corneal scarring, 
and even loss of the eye). 
 21. See, e.g., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., MEMORANDUM: PUBLIC HEALTH 
INTERESTS AND FIRST AMENDMENT CONSIDERATIONS RELATED TO 
MANUFACTURER COMMUNICATIONS REGARDING UNAPPROVED USES OF APPROVED 
OR CLEARED MEDICAL PRODUCTS 4 10 (Jan. 2017) [hereinafter FDA MEMO], 
https://perma.cc/7S8E-JCYP (describing various ways FDA authorities 
advance public health); DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER: 
ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE AND PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AT THE FDA 16 
(2010) (“[F]ederal regulation prevents and deters many sub-par and unsafe 
therapies from entering the American health-care system.”); Daniel Carpenter 
et al., Approval Regulation and Endogenous Consumer Confidence: Theory 
and Analogies to Licensing, Safety, and Financial Regulation, 4 REGUL. & 
GOVERNANCE 383, 400 (2010) (“Approval regulation leads to a superior 
distribution of products, . . . the provision of more information, and 
information of a higher quality . . . .”); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the 
FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 345, 347 (2007) 
(emphasizing the “important structural role that drug regulation has come to 
play in promoting a valuable form of pharmaceutical innovation . . . .”) 
[hereinafter Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy]; Rebecca S. 
Eisenberg, The Problem of New Uses, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 717, 
719–20 (2005) (asserting that the FDA motivates investment in clinical 
trials leading to greater information regarding a given drug and its 
effects is by requiring trials for approval); Amy Kapczynski, Dangerous 
Times: The FDA’s Role in Information Production, Past and Future, 102 MINN. 
L. REV. 2357, 2358 (2018) (“The core function of the FDA as a drug 
regulator . . . is not to make choices for the public, or to certify the truth, but 
to generate and validate information about medicines.”); Christopher 
Robertson & Victor Laurion, Tip of the Iceberg II: How the Intended-Uses 
Principle Produces Medical Knowledge and Protects Liberty, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & 
LIBERTY 770, 774 (2017) (“By putting the burden of proof on drug and device 
makers who typically hold patents, and thus can reap the profits from proven 
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non-therapeutic uses to be safe and effective may not be 
required as a normative matter. For example, the FDA 
reasonably could view consumers—who voluntarily elect to use 
products for non-therapeutic purposes—as in need of less 
protection than patients, who may be de facto forced to use a 
drug or device by their disease or condition.22 Such a view may 
justify a flexible approach to weighing a non-therapeutic 
product’s benefits and risks.23 To be clear, this is not to say that 
the FDA will, or must, conclude that all non-therapeutic uses 
are safe and effective (or that all non-therapeutic technologies 
fall within its jurisdiction).24 Rather, this Article argues that the 
FDCA does not preclude the agency from evaluating the safety 
and effectiveness of specific non-therapeutic uses, just as it 
evaluates therapeutic ones, without necessarily banning entire 
categories of technologies. 
To develop the Article’s arguments, Part I first describes 
what this Article means by the term “non-therapeutic use,” and 
how such uses could fall within the drug and device definitions. 
Part II examines some boundaries on the expansive drug and 
device definitions, and explains why the argument that 
non-therapeutic uses could never be judged safe and effective 
may be a tempting tool to limit FDA jurisdiction. Part III 
explains the flexibility that the FDCA gives the agency to 
determine when a use is safe effective. It then considers the 
 
uses, [the FDCA] regulatory regime produces knowledge which was not 
produced in the unregulated market that preceded it.”).  
 22. Cf. Patricia J. Zettler, What Lies Ahead for FDA Regulation of tDCS 
Products?, 3 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 318, 322 (2016) [hereinafter What Lies Ahead] 
(“[W]e might think that individuals who are sick deserve special protection 
from unproven or risky products and, therefore, less favorable or less certain 
risk-benefit profiles are acceptable for enhancement products that consumers 
voluntarily decide to use.”); Scott Gottlieb, Comm’r Food & Drugs, U.S. Food 
& Drug Admin., Speech at America’s Health Insurance Plans’ National Health 
Policy Conference: Capturing the Benefits of Competition for Patients (Mar. 
7, 2018), https://perma.cc/BQ22-FSY7 (“Is a patient really in a position to 
make an economically-based decision? . . . Of course not.”). 
 23. See infra notes 235 238 and accompanying text.  
 24. But see Maxwell J. Mehlman, How Will We Regulate Genetic 
Enhancement?, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 671, 701 (1999) (arguing that the 
FDA’s assessment of the safety and effectiveness of non-therapeutic 
technologies “would be compromised by the data deficiencies and subjectivity 
of judgments about risk and benefit”). 
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FDA’s history of assessing the risks and benefits of 
non-therapeutic uses of drugs and devices, demonstrating that 
the agency’s premarket review, as a descriptive matter, has not 
been an insurmountable obstacle. Finally, Part IV begins to 
examine how the FDCA’s safety and effectiveness standard 
should be applied to non-therapeutic uses, in light of the 
purposes that FDA premarket review of safety and effectiveness 
is thought to serve. At a time when new, or newly legal, 
non-therapeutic technologies may be poised to emerge, better 
understanding of the potential scope of FDA jurisdiction is 
critical to anticipating the regulatory landscape for such 
technologies. 
I.  NON-THERAPEUTIC USES AND THE DRUG AND DEVICE 
DEFINITIONS 
The line between therapeutic, and non-therapeutic 
technologies, is, as numerous scholars have noted, difficult to 
draw.25 Moreover, the FDA does not formally distinguish 
between therapeutic and non-therapeutic uses of products that 
meet the definition of a drug or device—a drug is a drug, and a 
device is a device, whether or not its purpose is therapeutic. The 
FDA generally has jurisdiction over any product that falls 
within these definitions.26 This Part, thus, starts by describing 
 
 25. See, e.g., Henry T. Greely, Direct Brain Interventions to Treat 
Disfavored Human Behaviors: Ethical and Social Issues, 91 CLINICAL 
PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 163, 163 (2012) (“Behaviors do not come 
naturally labeled as ‘disease’ and ‘nondisease;’ humans make those 
distinctions, and . . . we regularly change them . . . .”); Matt Lamkin, 
Legitimate Medicine in the Age of Consumerism, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 385, 
421 (2019) [hereinafter Legitimate Medicine] (describing “the blurring line 
between medical and recreational [drug] use”). 
  26. To be within the FDA’s jurisdiction, a product both must meet the 
definition of a drug or device and it (or one of its components) must move in 
interstate commerce. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1); id. § 321(h); id. § 331. 
However, because modern supply chains and production processes generally 
involve at least one component of a product crossing state or national 
boundaries, this latter limitation on the FDA’s jurisdiction is rarely relevant. 
Cf. United States v. Regenerative Scis., LLC, 741 F.3d 1314, 1320 (D.C. Cir. 
2014) (finding the required intersection with interstate commerce for an 
autologous stem cell intervention); Memorandum from Robert Charrow, Gen. 
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what this Article means by the term “non-therapeutic use” of a 
drug or device, in the absence of an FDA definition. It then 
explains how such non-therapeutic uses can fit within the 
FDCA’s drug and device definitions. 
A.  Defining ‘Non-Therapeutic Uses’ 
To start, this Article generally uses the term 
non-therapeutic use, rather than non-therapeutic product, 
because the FDA’s regulatory scheme addresses specific uses of 
products.27 Regardless of a drug or device’s route through the 
 
Couns., Dep’t Health & Hum. Servs. to Stephen Hahn, Comm’r Food & Drugs 
7 (June 22, 2020) [hereinafter LDT Memo], https://perma.cc/5UTK-L7AV 
(PDF) (explaining the interstate commerce requirement for devices in the 
FDCA). Jurisdictional debates also arise over whether a particular 
intervention—for example, a stem cell intervention—involves a product 
regulated by the FDA or is, instead, a part of medical practice, typically 
thought to be regulated by the states. See Regenerative Scis., 741 F.3d at 
1319 20. As I have argued elsewhere, the product-practice distinction, 
however, is blurry and may not be useful for determining the scope of the 
FDA’s jurisdiction. See Patricia J. Zettler, Pharmaceutical Federalism, 92 IND. 
L.J. 845, 892 (2017); see also Lars Noah, Ambivalent Commitments to 
Federalism in Controlling the Practice of Medicine, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 149, 173 
(2004) (“Given its power to prevent the sale of drugs and medical devices until 
persuaded of their safety and effectiveness, the FDA undoubtedly affects the 
practice of medicine, even if only indirectly.”); Barbara J. Evans, 
Distinguishing Product and Practice Regulation in Personalized Medicine, 81 
CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 288, 288 (2007) (“[P]reserving the 
crucial distinction between product and practice regulation, may require 
innovative regulatory approaches”); Margaret Foster Riley, An Unfulfilled 
Promise: Changes Needed to the Drug Approval Process to Make Personalized 
Medicine a Reality, 70 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 289, 308 (2015) (“In 2007, FDAAA 
introduced potentially far-reaching limits on the practice of medicine doctrine 
allowing FDA to impose restrictions (e.g. place and mode of use) on approved 
drugs . . . .”); Myrisha S. Lewis, How Subterranean Regulation Hinders 
Innovation in Assisted Reproductive Technology, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1239, 
1265 (2018) (“In light of the blurring distinctions between medical devices, 
human tissues, drugs, and the practice of medicine, if the FDA does have 
jurisdiction over advanced assisted reproductive technologies, it should clearly 
explain the source of that jurisdiction . . . .”); Myrisha S. Lewis, Innovating 
Federalism in the Life Sciences, 92 TEMP. L. REV. 383, 391 (2020) (explaining 
that the line between medical practice and medical products “has been 
‘blurring’ over time”). 
 27. See, e.g., FDA MEMO, supra note 21, at 1. 
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FDA’s premarket review processes, an FDA authorization 
decision is specific to the product’s intended use.28 That is, the 
FDA does not assess a product’s safety and effectiveness as a 
general matter. Rather it assesses the benefits and risks for the 
specific use described in the product’s proposed labeling. 
Accordingly, the FDA might judge the exact same product to be 
safe and effective for one use but not for another. For example, 
in 2004 the FDA approved the drug Avastin (bevacizumab) for 
treating colon cancer, and then in subsequent years for use in 
breast, lung, kidney, and brain cancers as well.29 In 2011, the 
FDA withdrew its approval of Avastin for use in metastatic 
breast cancer after determining the drug had not been 
demonstrated safe and effective for that one use.30 The drug, 
however, remains approved for the other uses, for which, in the 
FDA’s view, there continues to be evidence that the drug’s 
benefits outweigh its risks.31  
Perhaps more relevant, however, is the question of what 
this Article means by “non-therapeutic.” Although some of the 
limits on the FDA’s drug or device jurisdiction implicate the line 
between therapeutic and non-therapeutic uses of products, the 
FDA has not formally explained—such as through guidance or 
a regulation—the agency’s thinking about what constitutes a 
therapeutic or a non-therapeutic use of a drug or device.32 In the 
 
 28. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(d); id. § 360c(f)(2); id. § 360c(i); id. § 360e(d); 42 
U.S.C. § 262(a); see also FDA MEMO, supra note 21, at 1 (describing the reasons 
for evaluating a product for a particular use). 
 29. See, e.g., Summary Review for Regulatory Action: Avastin, U.S. FOOD 
& DRUG ADMIN. (Aug. 14, 2014), https://perma.cc/VKV3-4CGU (PDF). 
 30. See Avastin (bevacizumab) Information, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. 
(Feb. 5, 2018), https://perma.cc/G5DG-VVRS.  
 31. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., AVASTIN LABELING (2020), https://
perma.cc/43HW-D2YU (PDF). 
 32. For example, the FDA has declined to consider some device-like 
products that lack a medical purpose—such as certain exercise equipment—
to be devices. See 21 C.F.R. § 890.5350 (2020); see also Physical Medicine 
Devices; General Provisions and Classification of 82 Devices, 48 Fed. Reg. 
53,032, 53,035 (Nov. 23, 1983) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 890) (“FDA has 
changed the regulations classifying many physical medicine devices to clarify 
that the regulations apply only to those products intended for medical 
purposes.”). As another example, an agency regulation explains what 
constitutes a claim that a product affects the structure or function of the body 
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absence of an FDA definition and consistent with the 
literature,33 this Article uses the term “non-therapeutic use” to 
describe aesthetic, enhancing, or recreational uses of drugs and 
devices, rather than health-maintenance or disease-addressing 
uses.34  
More specifically, aesthetic uses are those intended to alter 
a person’s appearance in some way that affects the structure or 
function of the body, for example injecting human skin with a 
fluorescent protein from jellyfish to make the skin glow.35 
Enhancing uses are those intended to improve a healthy 
person’s physical or mental performance to a level beyond what 
is typical for them or beyond the statistically normal range for 
humans.36 For instance, students who use stimulants in an 
 
versus a claim that a product addresses disease—because the line between 
such claims is critical to appropriately classifying certain products as either 
dietary supplements or drugs under the FDCA. See 21 C.F.R. § 101.93 (2020). 
But the line between a product use that is intended to affect the structure or 
function of the body and one that is intended to address disease is not 
necessarily the same as the line between a therapeutic and non-therapeutic 
use of that product. Some structure/function uses may be therapeutic. For 
example, “maintains healthy lung function” is a claim that a product is 
intended to affect the structure or function of the body, but such a claim also 
seems to have health-related implications—even if related to maintaining 
health rather than treating a deficit. Regulations on Statements Made for 
Dietary Supplements Concerning the Effect of the Product on the Structure or 
Function of the Body, 65 Fed. Reg. 1,000, 1,018 (Jan. 6, 2000) (to be codified 
at 21 C.F.R. pt. 101). See infra Part II.B for further discussion of this point. 
 33. See, e.g., Henry T. Greely et al., Towards Responsible Use of 
Cognitive-Enhancing Drugs by the Healthy, 456 NATURE 702, 703 (2008).  
 34. Cf. Christi J. Guerrini et al., DIY CRISPR, 97 N.C. L. REV. 1399, 1413 
(2019) (describing similar categories). 
 35. See Kristen V. Brown, Genetically Engineering Yourself Sounds Like 
a Horrible Idea—But This Guy Is Doing It Anyway, GIZMODO (Nov. 29, 2017, 
10:00 AM), https://perma.cc/82R5-TQQB (describing a biohacker’s attempt to 
make his skin glow). 
 36. See, e.g., 2 PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL 
ISSUES, GRAY MATTERS: TOPICS AT THE INTERSECTION OF NEUROSCIENCE, 
ETHICS, AND SOCIETY 28 (2015) [hereinafter GRAY MATTERS], https://perma.cc
/33MA-36HW; see also Henry T. Greely, Remarks on Human Biological 
Enhancement, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 1139, 1140 (2008) (“[Enhancement] is using 
things not only to repair or bring up the human norm, but also to surpass 
either the preexisting position or to go to the extreme to move outside the 
normal human range.”); Dov Fox, Safety, Efficacy, and Authenticity: The Gap 
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effort to improve their academic performance are often 
described as using drugs for cognitive enhancement.37 
Recreational uses are those uses of drugs and devices that are, 
perhaps most simply, not for therapeutic, aesthetic, or 
enhancing purposes.38 Inhaling nitrous oxide for a high, for 
instance, would be a recreational or adult use.39  
Of course, where to draw the line between an aesthetic, 
enhancing, recreational, or therapeutic use is not always, and 
perhaps is only rarely, clear.40 For example, a leading advocate 
for legalizing medical uses of cannabis famously asserted that 
“all [adult] marijuana use is medical”—on the ground that 
“stress relief is a medical purpose, [so] any adult who uses 
cannabis does so for medical reasons.”41 As another example, 
people who use attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) 
 
Between Ethics and Law in FDA Decisionmaking, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1135, 
1137 38 (“Enhancements are distinct from other biomedical products in that 
they are put to uses which extend beyond the goal of preventing disease, 
repairing disability, and restoring physiological wholeness.”); cf. Efthimios 
Parasidis, Human Enhancement and Experimental Research in the Military, 
44 CONN. L. REV. 1117, 1129 (2012) (explaining that the military has “sought 
to leverage innovative medical products and technologies . . . to make the 
individual warfighter stronger, more alert, more endurant, and better able to 
heal” (internal quotations omitted)). 
 37. See Greely et al., supra note 33, at 702; see also Legitimate Medicine, 
supra note 25, at 422 (discussing the difficulty of distinguishing medical and 
enhancing uses of certain drugs). 
 38. Cf. Kamin, supra note 15, at 623 24 (“Recreational laws short-circuit 
the entire rubric of the [Controlled Substances Act] framework, treating 
marijuana not as a controlled substance at all, but as something more akin to 
alcohol or tobacco.”). 
 39. See, e.g., Aaron Rowe, Chem Lab: The Downside of Getting High on 
Nitrous Oxide, WIRED (Dec. 9, 2007, 9:49 PM), https://perma.cc/64NC-NCL8. 
 40. See, e.g., GRAY MATTERS, supra note 36, at 28 29 (“Drawing clear lines 
between maintaining or improving function within normal ranges on one hand 
and expanding or augmenting on the other, or between treating as therapy on 
one hand and expanding or augmenting as enhancement on the other, can be 
difficult in both theory and practice.”); Legitimate Medicine, supra note 25, at 
387 (describing the “[c]ommon . . . confusion regarding the scope of legitimate 
medicine and the nature of drug abuse” that permeates controversies over use 
of various drugs). 
 41. Lewis A. Grossman, Life, Liberty, [and the Pursuit of Happiness]: 
Medical Marijuana Regulation in Historical Context, 74 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 
280, 282 83 (2019) (quoting Dennis Peron). 
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drugs to enhance their cognitive performance describe their 
reasons for doing so similarly to how patients who are 
prescribed drugs to treat their ADHD describe their reasons for 
use.42 Partly for this reason, Matt Lamkin has argued that such 
enhancing uses are distinguishable from therapeutic uses only 
“by whether the user has a prescription for the drug.”43 
Not only is the distinction between therapeutic and 
non-therapeutic uses a conceptually hazy one, but the 
pharmaceutical and device industries also have long been 
criticized for proactively muddying the distinction to help sell 
their products.44 Critics argue that some industry advertising 
and promotion efforts medicalize the discomforts of ordinary life 
to sell more products—such as a disease awareness campaign 
that seeks to persuade consumers that particular symptoms 
might constitute the treatable condition of “overactive 
bladder.”45 Similarly, certain business models may blur the line 
between therapeutic and non-therapeutic uses, as with at-home 
teeth aligners that are marketed as providing aesthetic 
improvements to users’ smiles but also as products that may be 
eligible for dental insurance coverage.46 
Questions about what counts as therapeutic and 
non-therapeutic uses—and how the distinction between the two 
might be manipulated—are important. But they are not the 
focus of this Article. Instead, this Article aims to consider the 
FDA’s jurisdiction over non-therapeutic uses of drugs and 
devices, whatever may fall into that “non-therapeutic” category. 
For that reason, this Article focuses on examples of drug and 
device uses that are generally, albeit not always, agreed to be 
non-therapeutic, such as the use of Botox (onabotulinumtoxinA) 
 
 42. See Legitimate Medicine, supra note 25, at 421 23. 
 43. Id. at 422. 
 44. See, e.g., Ray Moynihan et al., Selling Sickness: The Pharmaceutical 
Industry and Disease Mongering, 324 BRIT. MED. J. 886, 887 (2002). 
 45. See, e.g., id. at 889. 
 46. See, e.g., SMILE DIRECT CLUB, https://perma.cc/KL53-MCPV; cf. Anna 
Wexler et al., Direct-to-Consumer Orthodontics: Surveying User Experience, 
151 J. AM. DENTAL ASSOC. 625, 634 (2020) (describing consumers as having 
both aesthetic and oral-health-related reasons for seeking at-home teeth 
aligners). 
 
394 78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 379 (2021) 
 
to reduce facial wrinkles, the use of decorative contact lenses to 
change the appearance of the users’ eyes, and the recreational 
use of substances. Such uses of drugs and devices, also, notably, 
are not generally covered by health insurance plans, which 
typically reimburse for “medically necessary” services.47  
B.  The Expansive Text of the Statutory Definitions 
However precisely defined, non-therapeutic uses can fall 
within the FDA’s drug and device jurisdiction. The FDCA 
defines drugs and devices as including articles “intended for use 
in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of 
disease” and those “intended to affect the structure or any 
function of the body.”48 It is this latter part of the definition that 
generally has enabled the FDA to assert that non-therapeutic 
uses fall within its drug and device authorities. 
Given this statutory language, the key for determining 
whether an “article” is a drug or a device is typically its 
“intended use.”49 FDA regulations define intended use as the 
“objective intent of the persons legally responsible for the 
labeling,” which is usually a product’s manufacturer or seller.50 
 
 47. “Medically necessary” is broad enough to include uses of drugs and 
devices that are health-related, but not disease-focused—such as pregnancy 
tests performed in a physician’s office or oral contraceptives. See, e.g., EEOC 
v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1219 (D. Minn. 2001). 
However, “medically necessary” is not so broad as to typically include 
aesthetic, enhancing, or recreational uses of drugs and devices. See, e.g., id. at 
1219 n.2. 
 48. 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1); see id. § 321(h) (defining “device”). Devices are 
distinguished from drugs largely by the kinds of items that they are—items 
that do not “achieve [their] primary intended purpose through chemical action 
within or on the body . . . and . . . [are] not dependent on being metabolized” to 
achieve that purpose. Id. § 321(h); Genus Med. Techs., LLC v. FDA, 427 F. 
Supp. 3d 74, 77 (D.D.C. 2019) (citing 21 U.S.C. § 321(h)). Additionally, devices, 
unlike drugs, include articles intended for use in the diagnosis of “conditions.” 
21 U.S.C § 321(h); Shelby Baird, Note, Don’t Try This at Home: The FDA’s 
Restrictive Regulation of Home-Testing Devices, 67 DUKE L.J. 383, 393 (2017). 
This aspect of the device definition captures diagnostic tools that are not 
focused on diseases, but are nevertheless important, such as pregnancy tests. 
See 21 C.F.R. § 862.1155(a)(1) (2020). 
 49. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 201.128, 801.4 (2020).  
 50. Id. § 201.128.  
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Typically the requisite intended use is evinced by a 
manufacturer or seller’s public statements suggesting, explicitly 
or implicitly, that a product is intended to address disease 
(“disease claims”) or to affect the structure or function of the 
body (“structure/function claims”).51 For example, a 
manufacturer might state in its drug labeling that the product 
is “indicated for the treatment of metastatic colorectal cancer,” 
which would be a disease claim.52 As another example, a 
manufacturer might market a brain stimulation device for 
“increased [athletic] stamina and endurance,”53 or as a way to 
“charge your mind,” which would be explicit or implicit 
structure/function claims.54 
Consistent with these broad definitions, the FDA has 
asserted jurisdiction over a potentially surprising range of 
products. These include products commonly understood to be 
FDA-regulated drugs and devices, such as products marketed as 
cancer or COVID-19 therapies.55 These also include some 
products that may not be commonly understood to fall within 
the FDA’s drug and device authorities, such as antiperspirant,56 
epilators that remove hair,57 and products intended to produce 
a “chill” similar to that produced by cannabis.58  
Further underscoring the expansiveness of the definitions 
is that a manufacturer or seller’s public claims about its 
products are not the only source of evidence for ascertaining 
 
 51. See, e.g., id. § 101.93. 
 52. AVASTIN LABELING, supra note 31. 
 53. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Warning Letter to Big Dan’s Fitness and 
Nutrition, LLC (May 25, 2017), https://perma.cc/4Z8A-UMXV (identifying 
“increased stamina and endurance” as a structure/function claim). 
 54. What Lies Ahead, supra note 22, at 318. 
 55. See AVASTIN LABELING, supra note 31; COVID-19: An Update on the 
Federal Response: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Lab. & 
Pensions, 116th Cong. 6 (2020). 
 56. See, e.g., PETER HUTT ET AL., FOOD AND DRUG LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 117 (4th ed. 2013). 
 57. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 878.5350, 878.5360 (2020). 
 58. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Warning Letter to Green Planet Inc. 
(Dec. 5, 2013), https://perma.cc/4VB8-8QDF. 
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intended use.59 Courts have opined that the agency may 
consider “any relevant source” of evidence of intended use.60 As 
recently as September 2020, in a rule proposing changes to the 
regulatory definition of intended use, the agency reaffirmed its 
own view that it may consider “any relevant source of evidence” 
to determine a product’s intended use.61 A product’s design,62 
internal company statements,63 statements that a company 
previously made but no longer makes,64 and the overall 
 
 59. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 201.128, 801.4 (2020). For additional discussion of 
the kinds of evidence that may show a product’s intended use, see Patricia J. 
Zettler, et al., Closing the Regulatory Gap for Synthetic Nicotine Products, 59 
B.C. L. REV. 1933, 1956 67 (2018).  
 60. See, e.g., Nat’l Nutritional Foods Ass’n v. Mathews, 557 F.2d 325, 334 
(2d Cir. 1977); see also FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 
120, 143 (2000) (rejecting the FDA’s attempt to regulate tobacco products as 
drugs and devices, without disagreeing with the argument that the tobacco 
products’ design was evidence of their intended use). 
 61. Regulations Regarding “Intended Uses,” 85 Fed. Reg. 59,718, 59,721 
(proposed Sept. 23, 2020) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 801). 
 62. See, e.g., Nicotine in Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco Is a Drug and 
These Products Are Nicotine Delivery Devices Under the Federal Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act: Jurisdictional Determination, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,619, 
44,636– 37 (Aug. 28, 1996) (relying on product design as evidence of intended 
use); U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Warning Letter to Salton, Inc. (Aug. 20, 2006), 
https://perma.cc/327S-2YE3 [hereinafter Rejuvenique Warning Letter] 
(relying on the Rejuvenique product design as evidence of intended use). 
 63. See, e.g., United States v. Vascular Sols., Inc., 181 F. Supp. 3d 342, 
347 (W.D. Tex. 2016) (permitting the use of non-public statements as evidence 
of intended use). 
 64. See, e.g., United States v. 789 Cases, More or Less, of Latex Surgeons’ 
Gloves, an Article of Device, 799 F. Supp. 1275, 1285 (D.P.R. 1992) (“[A] 
manufacturer . . . cannot avoid the reaches of the [FDCA] by stating that the 
product has a different—and non-regulated use. The Courts have recognized 
the ‘carry-over effect’ that is created by a manufacturer’s original 
representations about the product.”); United States v. Undetermined 
Quantities of an Article of Drug Labeled as “Exachol”, 716 F. Supp. 787, 791 
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (“Courts have recognized that where years later customers 
purchase a product in reliance on the therapeutic claims of the previous 
literature marketed with that product, the court may use such literature to 
determine the intent in marketing the product despite a later disclaimer.”); 
see also Allergan, Inc. v. Athena Cosms., Inc., 738 F.3d 1350, 1356–57 (Fed. 
Cir. 2013) (concluding that a company’s past claims that its product affected 
the structure of eyelashes were relevant to an intended use analysis because 
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environment in which a product is distributed65 are all among 
the other kinds of evidence on which the FDA has relied to 
demonstrate the requisite intended use.66 For instance, the FDA 
has taken the position that a machine designed to use electrical 
current to contract facial muscles, in order to tighten skin and 
reduce wrinkles, is a device “even if no claims were made for its 
specific use.”67 In other words, a company cannot necessarily 
avoid its product being regulated as a drug or device solely by 
avoiding both disease and structure/function claims. 
II.  FINDING BOUNDARIES FOR THE DEFINITIONS 
Although broad, the drug and device definitions are not 
limitless. Through the statutory structure of the FDCA or even 
through statutory amendments addressing specific 
technologies, Congress has placed boundaries on the scope of the 
drug and device definitions.68 Likewise, courts and the FDA 
have sought to interpret the statute in ways that draw 
reasonable boundaries around the expansive definitions.69 This 
section explores various boundaries on the drug and device 
definitions, and suggests that, for at least some emerging 
non-therapeutic uses, there is no clear limit on the FDA’s ability 
to regulate them as drugs and devices70 —leaving the door open 
 
the company did not materially alter its product’s formulation or disavow its 
previous claims). 
 65. See, e.g., United States v. Storage Spaces Designated Nos. 8 & 49, 777 
F.2d 1363, 1366 n.5 (9th Cir. 1985) (concluding that the “overall 
circumstances” showed that products labeled as incense were drugs); United 
States v. Travia, 180 F. Supp. 2d 115, 119 (D.D.C. 2001) (concluding that 
unlabeled nitrous oxide sold outside a rock concert was a drug because the 
“environment provided the necessary information between buyer and seller”). 
 66. But see Sean M. O’Connor & Erika Lietzan, The Surprising Reach of 
FDA Regulation of Cannabis, Even After Descheduling, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 823, 
903 (2019) (expressing skepticism about the FDA relying on these kinds of 
evidence of intended use). 
 67. Rejuvenique Warning Letter, supra note 62. 
 68. See infra Part II.A–B. 
 69. See infra Part II.C–E. 
 70. Cf. O’Connor & Lietzan, supra note 66, at 903 (arguing that the FDA 
asserting jurisdiction over recreational uses of cannabis products would be 
controversial). 
 
398 78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 379 (2021) 
 
to arguments that FDA cannot do so because the uses could 
never be judged safe and effective. 
 A. Other Product Definitions 
One clear way that the drug and device definitions are 
limited are by the FDCA’s definitions of “other products.” 
Congress has placed certain kinds of non-therapeutic uses of 
products—that otherwise might satisfy the drug or device 
definition—outside the scope of the FDA’s drug and device 
jurisdiction by creating other product categories, such as 
cosmetics,71 tobacco products,72 and dietary supplements.73 
Cosmetics are not intended to address disease or affect the 
structure or function of the body, and instead are intended “for 
cleansing, beautifying, promoting attractiveness, or 
altering . . . appearance.”74 Tobacco products—products “made 
or derived from tobacco” including e-cigarettes that use 
tobacco-derived e-liquid—cannot be marketed to address 
disease, but may be marketed as affecting the structure or 
function of the body as long as the structure/function claims are 
those that have been customarily made about tobacco (e.g., 
“satisfying”).75 Similarly, dietary supplements—which must 
 
 71. 21 U.S.C. § 321(i). A product can meet the definition of both a 
cosmetic and a drug or device, if it is intended to both alter appearance and 
affect the structure or function of the body. See Is It a Cosmetic, a Drug, or 
Both? (Or Is It Soap?), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Aug. 24, 2020), https://
perma.cc/Z3S9-FLSA. In such instances of products that are a combination of 
a cosmetic and a drug or device, the product is regulated according to the more 
stringent drug or device rules. See id. 
 72. 21 U.S.C. § 321(ff). Unlike cosmetics, the FDA generally takes the 
position that a product cannot meet both the definition of a dietary supplement 
and of a drug or device, nor may a dietary supplement be combined with a 
drug or device. See, e.g., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Warning Letter to Proctor 
& Gamble (Oct. 29, 2009), https://perma.cc/YMR7-D7KA. 
 73. 21 U.S.C. § 321(rr). The FDCA specifies that a product cannot meet 
both the definition of a tobacco product and of a drug or device, and that a 
tobacco product may not be combined with a drug or device. See id. § 321(rr)(2), 
(4). 
 74. Id. § 321(i).  
 75. See id. § 321(rr)(1); Sottera, Inc. v. FDA, 627 F.3d 891, 894 (D.C. Cir. 
2010); see also Clarification of When Products Made or Derived from Tobacco 
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contain a dietary ingredient, such as an herb, and cannot 
contain approved or studied drug ingredients—generally may 
be marketed with structure/function claims but not disease 
claims.76 Cosmetics and dietary supplements are generally not 
subject to FDA premarket review,77 and, although new tobacco 
products are subject to premarket review, it is a different 
process than that for drugs and devices.78 Through these 
avenues, therefore, some (but not all) products with 
non-therapeutic uses, such as a cosmetic cream intended to 
reduce the appearance of, but not the actual existence of, 
wrinkles or an herb intended to support muscle tone, may reach 
 
Are Regulated as Drugs, Devices, or Combination Products; Amendments to 
Regulations Regarding “Intended Uses,” 82 Fed. Reg. 2,193, 2,197–98 (Jan. 9, 
2017) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 801, 1100) (noting that Soterra 
stands for the proposition that “customarily marketed tobacco products were 
sold without therapeutic claims and should be regulated as tobacco products 
under the [FDCA]”); FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 
143 (2000) (concluding, before the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco 
Control Act of 2009 expressly granted the FDA authority to regulate tobacco 
products, that the FDA did not have authority to regulate tobacco products 
because they did not make claims about “therapeutic or medical benefit”); 
Action on Smoking & Health v. Harris, 655 F.2d 236, 240 (D.C. Cir. 1980) 
(affirming the FDA’s then-decision to decline to categorize cigarettes as drugs 
or devices). According to the FDA, a manufacturer’s claim that its tobacco 
product is “satisfying” is an implicit structure/function claim that amounts to 
a “euphemism[] for the delivery of a pharmacologically active dose of nicotine.” 
Clarification of When Products Made or Derived from Tobacco Are Regulated 
as Drugs, Devices, or Combination Products; Amendments to Regulations 
Regarding “Intended Uses,” 82 Fed. Reg. 2,204. 
 76. See 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(6)(A); 21 C.F.R. §§ 101.14(a)(1), 101.93 (2020); 
see also Label Claims for Conventional Foods and Dietary Supplements, U.S. 
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (June 19, 2018), https://perma.cc/ZM4A-AAVX 
(explaining that in some circumstances, claims can be made that dietary 
supplements are intended to reduce the risk of disease—for example that 
calcium may reduce the risk of developing osteoarthritis—without triggering 
the FDA’s drug authorities). 
 77. See, e.g., Is It a Cosmetic, a Drug, or Both? (Or Is It Soap?), supra note 
71. 
 78. Compare 21 U.S.C. § 387j (providing the standard for premarket 
review of tobacco products), with id. § 355(d) (providing the approval standard 
for drugs). 
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the market without being subject to the FDA’s drug and device 
requirements.79 
 B.  Statutory Amendments for Specific Technologies 
Notwithstanding these other product categories, the broad 
language of the drug and device definitions generally gives the 
FDA wide discretion to determine what products are subject to 
drug and device requirements—discretion that the agency has 
used both to decline, and to assert, jurisdiction over certain 
non-therapeutic uses.80 At times, when Congress has disagreed 
with the agency’s decision about its jurisdiction, it has amended 
the FDCA to address whether a specific non-therapeutic 
technology is a drug or device.81  
The story behind how FDA came to regulate decorative 
contact lenses as devices provides one example. In 2002, there 
were reports that the FDA was going to decline to categorize 
decorative lenses as devices.82 After learning this news, in 
August 2002, then-Representative Henry Waxman wrote a 
letter to then-Secretary of Health and Human Services Tommy 
Thompson arguing that all contact lenses are devices under the 
 
 79. See, e.g., Regulations on Statements Made for Dietary Supplements 
Concerning the Effect of the Product on the Structure or Function of the Body, 
65 Fed. Reg. 1,000, 1,020 (Jan. 6, 2000) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 101). 
 80. See, e.g., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 126; Harris, 
655 F.2d at 236. 
 81. Because the FDA is an agency within the Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS), HHS also may overrule FDA decisions on product 
jurisdiction. In August 2020, HHS issued an announcement limiting the FDA’s 
ability to regulate a category of diagnostic tests known as 
laboratory-developed tests (LDTs). See Rescission of Guidances and Other 
Informal Issuances Concerning Premarket Review of Laboratory Developed 
Tests, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Aug. 19, 2020), https://perma.cc/B82T-
7VUK. Although LDTs may not have many, if any, non-therapeutic uses, the 
LDT story provides an example of how HHS can affect the FDA’s flexibility to 
determine the scope of its jurisdiction. See LDT Memo, supra note 26, at 2 
(stating that HHS is deciding “under what circumstances, if any, does [the] 
FDA have the jurisdiction to regulate LDTs”). 
 82. See Proposal to Regulate Nonprescription Contact Lenses as Cosmetics 
Triggers Health Concerns, 10 NO. 12 GUIDE MED. DEVICE REG. NEWSL. 4 (2002) 
(describing concerns among Congress members and eye care professionals as 
a result of these reports, and the letter from Rep. Waxman). 
 
THE FDA’S POWER  401 
 
FDCA.83 The letter asserted that “a contact lens . . . reduces the 
flow of oxygen to and carbon dioxide from the cornea, create[ing] 
pressure on the underlying tissues and reduces wetting of the 
ocular surface” and thus “[a]ny manufacturer . . . that intends 
for users to place the products in the eye must also intend for 
these [structure/function] effects to occur.”84 Nevertheless, in 
2003, the FDA opined that decorative contact lenses were 
cosmetics intended to beautify, and not devices, “[p]rovided they 
are not marketed with claims that they effect physical or 
physiological change.”85 Ultimately, because of concerns about 
the risks of decorative lenses, in 2005, Congress removed the 
agency’s discretion on the issue and amended the FDCA to 
specify that all contact lenses are devices.86 
The FDA’s attempt to regulate certain mobile medical apps 
provides another example—but of Congress rejecting the 
agency’s attempt to assert, rather than decline, jurisdiction. In 
2013, the FDA issued a guidance document explaining its 
approach to regulating mobile medical apps as devices.87 
Certain members of Congress then expressed concern that FDA 
oversight would stifle innovation. In 2016, Congress ultimately 
 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Guidance for FDA Staff on Sampling or Detention Without Physical 
Examination of Decorative Contact Lenses (Import Alert #86-10); Availability, 
68 Fed. Reg. 16,520, 16,521 (Apr. 4, 2003) [hereinafter 2003 Decorative Lenses 
Import Alert]; see 21 U.S.C. § 321(i) (defining cosmetic). The FDA similarly 
took the position that decorative lenses were cosmetics in an October 2002 
Import Alert, but without explaining its reasoning. Detention Without Physical 
Examination of Decorative Contact Lenses (Import Alert #86-10), U.S. FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN. (Oct. 22, 2002), https://perma.cc/RJG9-2ENR (PDF). The agency 
reportedly adopted the new position on decorative lenses following a meeting 
between the agency’s then-Chief Counsel and a manufacturer of decorative 
contact lenses. See Proposal to Regulate Nonprescription Contact Lenses as 
Cosmetics Triggers Health Concerns, supra note 82. 
 86. See 21 U.S.C. § 360j(n); DECORATIVE LENSES GUIDANCE, supra note 4, 
at 2; Decorative Lenses Catch Congress’s Eye, 13 NO. 11 GUIDE MED. DEVICE 
REG. NEWSL. 8 (2005). 
 87. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., POLICY FOR DEVICE SOFTWARE 
FUNCTIONS AND MOBILE MEDICAL APPLICATIONS 10 (2013), https://perma.cc
/EQA3-EP7X (PDF) (describing the FDA’s regulatory approach for device 
software functions). 
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passed the 21st Century Cures Act, which, among other things, 
amended the FDCA to exclude from the device definition 
software—such as mobile apps—intended “for maintaining or 
encouraging a healthy lifestyle” when “unrelated to the 
diagnosis, cure, mitigation, prevention, or treatment of a 
disease or condition.”88 Although “maintaining or encouraging a 
healthy lifestyle” may suggest that software falling into this 
non-device category must have a therapeutic, health-related 
purpose, the FDA has taken the position that this definition also 
encompasses enhancing uses, such as products intended to 
“enhance learning capacity.”89 For example, a video game meant 
to improve a healthy person’s mental acuity—although intended 
to affect the structure or function of the brain—is likely no 
longer a device under the FDA’s jurisdiction.90 Such software is 
now not just outside of the FDA’s drug and device authorities, 
but is completely outside the agency’s jurisdiction. 
Nevertheless, many non-therapeutic uses have not been 
specifically addressed by Congress in this manner and may 
remain within the drug and device definitions.  
C.  Off-Label Uses 
Even when a particular product does fall within the drug or 
device definitions, the FDA, nevertheless, may not be tasked 
with reviewing and authorizing a non-therapeutic use of that 
product if the use is “off-label.” This is because, as explained in 
Part I.A, the agency’s weighing of the product’s risks and 
benefits, and its authorization decision, is not for a product as a 
 
 88. 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, § 3060, 130 Stat. 1033, 
1130 (2016). The concerns that FDA oversight would impede innovation in the 
mobile medical app industry were not necessarily justified. See, e.g., Nathan 
G. Cortez et al., FDA Regulation of Mobile Health Technologies, 371 NEW ENG. 
J. MED. 372, 373–75 (2014). 
 89. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GENERAL WELLNESS: POLICY FOR LOW RISK 
DEVICES 4 (2016), https://perma.cc/Y2KF-X699 (PDF). 
 90. See id. at 3. Before the 21st Century Cures Act was enacted, it was 
the FDA’s policy not to enforce device requirements for many such products, 
meaning the law may not have changed the regulatory scheme in practice. See, 
e.g., POLICY FOR DEVICE SOFTWARE FUNCTIONS AND MOBILE MEDICAL 
APPLICATIONS, supra note 87, at 12. 
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whole, but rather for the particular use that the manufacturer 
has proposed—to address a particular disease or condition, or 
have a particular effect on the body, for a specific population, 
and, for drugs, at a specified dose and in a specified dosage 
form.91 At the same time that the FDA authorizes a product—or 
more precisely, a particular use for the product—it also 
authorizes labeling that describes that use.92 Uses that the FDA 
has not authorized are not described in the FDA-authorized 
labeling, and thus are known as “off-label” uses.93 In this way, 
the manufacturer’s intentions determine the focus of the FDA’s 
premarket authorization decision for a particular product, as 
well as the scope of the labeling that the FDA authorizes for the 
product. 
This limited scope of FDA authorization, however, usually 
does not restrict how drugs and devices are actually used once 
they are marketed.94 Consistent with the conventional view that 
states are the primary regulators of medical practice, it has long 
been the FDA’s position that health care providers generally 
may prescribe or administer a legally marketed drug or device 
for any use (and patients or consumers may use a legally 
marketed product for any purpose), including “off-label” uses.95 
 
 91. See FDA MEMO, supra note 21, at 2–3; Nathan Cortez, The Statutory 
Case Against Off-Label Promotion, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE 124, 126 (2016); 
Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical 
Products, 82 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1826 (1996). 
 92. See, e.g., Erika Lietzan, The Drug Innovation Paradox, 83 MO. L. REV. 
39, 43 (2018); Sam F. Halabi, The Drug Repurposing Ecosystem: Intellectual 
Property, Incentives, Market Exclusivity, and the Future of “New” Medicines, 
20 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 39 (2018). 
 93. See, e.g., Cortez, supra note 91, at 124. 
 94. See, e.g., Legal Status of Approved Labeling for Prescription Drugs; 
Prescribing for Uses Unapproved by the FDA, 37 Fed. Reg. 16,503, 16,503 
(proposed Aug. 15, 1972) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 130). 
 95. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 396; FDA MEMO, supra note 21, at 3. There, 
however, are instances in which off-label use is prohibited or limited by FDA 
requirements (or state or Drug Enforcement Administration requirements). 
For example, the FDCA prohibits off-label prescribing of Human Growth 
Hormone (HGH). 21 U.S.C. § 333(e). The FDA also has the authority to require 
Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS) for drugs and special 
controls and restrictions for devices, all of which can have the effect of limiting 
health care professionals’ ability to prescribe or dispense products off-label. 
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Indeed, off-label uses, including certain well-known 
non-therapeutic uses, are common.96 For example, student use 
of Adderall (amphetamine aspartate), Ritalin (methyphenidate 
hydrochloride), and Provigil (modafinil) to improve academic 
performance has long been a high-profile, and controversial, 
example of performance-enhancing drug use.97 All of these 
drugs, however, are approved for other, therapeutic uses—
Adderall for ADHD and narcolepsy,98 Ritalin for ADHD,99 and 
Provigil for narcolepsy and other sleep disorders.100 The FDA, 
therefore, has not evaluated the well-known 
performance-enhancing uses of these drugs. 
At the same time that off-label uses are generally 
permitted, the FDA has long interpreted the FDCA as 
prohibiting manufacturers from promoting their drugs and 
 
See, e.g., id. § 355-1; Patricia J. Zettler, The Indirect Consequences of 
Expanded Off-Label Promotion, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 1053, 1081 (2017) 
[hereinafter Indirect Consequences]. 
 96. See Tewodros Eguale et al., Drug, Patient, and Physician 
Characteristics Associated with Off-Label Prescribing in Primary Care, 172 
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 781, 781 (2012); Tewodros Eguale et al., Association 
of Off-Label Drug Use and Adverse Drug Events in an Adult Population, 176 
J. AM. MED. ASS’N INTERNAL MED. 55, 60 (2016). 
 97. See Greely et al., supra note 33, at 702; see also GRAY MATTERS, supra 
note 36, at 37 (“[O]ne review of Provigil® and Ritalin® use for cognitive 
enhancement states that expectations regarding the effectiveness of these 
drugs exceed their actual effects.” (citations omitted)). 
 98. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., ADDERALL LABELING, https://perma.cc
/KB4U-ZF5B (PDF) (last updated Jan. 2017).  
 99. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., RITALIN LABELING (Jan. 2017), https://
perma.cc/CLQ2-XTC9 (PDF). 
 100. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PROVIGIL LABELING, https://perma.cc
/3Z9X-HHFB (PDF) (last updated Jan. 2015). One of Provigil’s approved 
indications is for excessive sleepiness associated with “shift work disorder.” Id. 
at 1. Characterizing the negative circadian rhythm effects of shift work as a 
disorder is an example of what some commentators have criticized as the 
medicalization of the problems of ordinary life (or the medicalization of a 
problem that may be best fixed through non-medical means, such as more 
humane workplace policies). See, e.g., Robert Meadows et al., The Sociology of 
Sleep, in SLEEP, HEALTH, AND SOCIETY: FROM AETIOLOGY TO PUBLIC HEALTH 
275, 277 (Francesco P. Cappuccio et al. eds., 2010). 
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devices for off-label uses.101 The FDA’s policies on off-label 
promotion are controversial and have been subject to legal 
challenges grounded in the First Amendment.102 But the agency 
has yet to significantly change its approach to off-label 
promotion (and First Amendment challenges have yet to require 
the agency to do so).103 Accordingly, although off-label uses are 
often not regulated by the FDA, manufacturers that wish to 
promote non-therapeutic uses of their drugs and devices 
generally must first obtain FDA authorization for those uses. 
 
 101. See, e.g., Cortez, supra note 91, at 130; FDA MEMO, supra note 21, at 
29. The FDCA does not expressly prohibit the promotion of unauthorized uses. 
Instead, the FDCA prohibits distributing in interstate commerce misbranded, 
adulterated, or unauthorized new drugs and devices. 21 U.S.C. § 331(a). And, 
under the FDA’s interpretation of the FDCA, when a manufacturer promotes 
an FDA-authorized drug or device for an unauthorized use, that causes a drug 
to be misbranded (or, in some cases, to be an unapproved new drug), and a 
device to be misbranded or adulterated. See, e.g., Cortez, supra note 91, at 130. 
 102. For a small selection of articles on off-label promotion, see Joshua M. 
Sharfstein & Alta Charo, The Promotion of Medical Products in the 21st 
Century: Off-Label Marketing and First Amendment Concerns, 314 J. AM. 
MED. ASS’N 1795, 1796 (2015); Ralph F. Hall & Elizabeth S. Sobotka, 
Inconsistent Government Policies: Why FDA Off-Label Regulation Cannot 
Survive First Amendment Review Under Greater New Orleans, 62 FOOD & 
DRUG L.J. 1, 1 (2007); George Horvath, Off-Label Drug Risks: Toward A New 
FDA Regulatory Approach, 29 ANNALS HEALTH L. & LIFE SCI. 101, 101 (2020); 
Jeffrey Chasnow & Geoffrey Levitt, Off-Label Communications: The Prodigal 
Returns, 73 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 257, 257 (2018); Joan H. Krause, Truth, Falsity, 
and Fraud: Off-Label Drug Settlements and the Future of the Civil False 
Claims Act, 71 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 401, 404 (2016); Aaron S. Kesselheim & 
Michelle M. Mello, Prospects for Regulation of Off-Label Drug Promotion in an 
Era of Expanding Commercial Speech Protection, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1539, 1542 
(2014); David Orentlicher, Off-Label Drug Marketing, the First Amendment, 
and Federalism, 50 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 89, 92 (2016); Christopher 
Robertson, The Tip of the Iceberg: A First Amendment Right to Promote Drugs 
Off-Label, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 1019, 1020 (2017); John Kamp et al., FDA 
Marketing v. First Amendment: Washington Legal Foundation Legal 
Challenges to Off-Label Policies May Force Unprecedented Changes at FDA, 
54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 555, 555 (1999); Indirect Consequences, supra note 95, at 
1061.  
 103. See FDA MEMO, supra note 21, at 20.  
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D.  “Medical” Use 
Caselaw and the FDA’s regulatory history also provide 
some possible limits on the drug and device definitions. In the 
1960s and 1970s two circuit courts and one district court 
concluded that structure/function claims must be “medical” in 
nature to make a product—in those cases, a wrinkle cream—a 
drug or device.104 Relying on these cases, the FDA also has 
stated in a few instances that a product must have a “medical 
application” to fall within the device definition, specifically.105 
For example, the agency declined to categorize as devices 
exercise equipment intended for recreational purposes as well 
as implantable chips used for non-medical identification 
purposes, despite the fact such products are clearly intended to 
affect the structure or function of the body.106   
Although requiring that drugs and devices have a “medical” 
application might, on its face, seem to exclude non-therapeutic 
uses from the FDA’s drug and device authorities, courts and the 
 
 104. See United States v. An Article . . . Consisting of 216 Cartoned 
Bottles, More or Less, Sudden Change, 409 F.2d 734, 742 (2d Cir. 1969); 
United States v. An Article Consisting of 36 Boxes, More or Less, Labeled 
“Line Away Temp. Wrinkle Smoother, Coty,” 415 F.2d 369, 372 (3d Cir. 1969); 
United States v. Article of Drug 47 Ship. Cartons, More or Less, “Helene Curtis 
Magic Secret”, 331 F. Supp. 912, 917 (D. Md. 1971); see also Anna Wexler, A 
Pragmatic Analysis of the Regulation of Consumer Transcranial Direct 
Current Stimulation (tDCS) Devices in the United States, 2 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 
669, 681 (2015) (discussing these cases). 
 105. See HUTT ET AL., supra note 56, at 125–28 (reprinting a 2002 letter 
from the FDA’s then-Chief Counsel stating that a microminiature transponder 
implant was not a device because it did not affect the body in a medical or 
drug-type fashion); United States v. Undetermined No. of Unlabeled Cases, 21 
F.3d 1026, 1030 (10th Cir. 1994) (Cook, J., dissenting) (“The government 
concedes that it does not claim that a device which has no medical application 
could qualify as a device under the FDCA.” (citations omitted)); cf. Gary E. 
Gamerman, Note, Intended Use and Medical Devices: Distinguishing 
Nonmedical “Devices” from Medical “Devices” Under 21 U.S.C. 321(h), 61 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 806, 807 (1993) (“[W]hen the manufacturer implies that the 
product has medicinal properties, courts have upheld FDA jurisdiction. 
Conversely, absent such representations, FDA assertion of jurisdiction has 
failed.”). 
 106. See Physical Medicine Devices; General Provisions and Classification 
of 82 Devices, 48 Fed. Reg. 53,032, 53,043 (Nov. 23, 1983) (to be codified at 21 
C.F.R. pt. 890); HUTT ET AL., supra note 56, at 125–28. 
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agency have not consistently interpreted the drug and device 
definitions so narrowly. The courts that suggested that 
structure/function claims must have a “medical” connotation 
also construed a wide variety of claims, including claims such as 
“tighten[s] the skin,” to meet that standard—so long as the 
claims were “drug-type.”107 In other cases, courts simply have 
not declared that structure/function claims must have a medical 
connotation to make a product a drug or device.108 Likewise, 
notwithstanding its statements in the context of exercise 
equipment and implantable chips, the FDA has in some 
instances construed non-therapeutic uses of products to be 
drugs or devices—such as injectable dermal fillers intended to 
eliminate wrinkles or enhance lips, “micro-needling” machines 
intended to improve the skin’s texture or tone, and products 
intended for spider vein removal.109 Indeed, if it were true that 
 
 107. See Line Away, 415 F.2d at 372; Sudden Change, 409 F.2d at 742. But 
see Helene Curtis Magic Secret, 331 F. Supp. at 915 (concluding that a wrinkle 
cream that made claims similar to those described in Line Away was not a 
drug). 
 108. See, e.g., United States v. Storage Spaces Designated Nos. 8 & 49, 777 
F.2d 1363, 1366 (9th Cir. 1985) (stating that a product intended for use as a 
cocaine substitute was a drug under the FDCA); Nutrilab, Inc. v. Schweiker, 
713 F.2d 335, 339 (7th Cir. 1983) (concluding that starch blockers are drugs 
because “they are intended to affect digestion in the people who take them”); 
United States v. Travia, 180 F. Supp. 2d 115, 119 (D.D.C. 2001) (concluding 
that nitrous oxide sold outside a rock concert was a drug); U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., Warning Letter to Arco Globus Trading LCC (Dec. 11, 2017), https://
perma.cc/W248-98NF (concluding that products marketed as  producing 
“euphoria” are drugs); U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Warning Letter to ALV 
Supplement Direct, (Mar. 3, 2016), https://perma.cc/E55L-6C2X (concluding 
that products marketed as “boosting energy,” burning fat, and “increase[ing] 
focus” are drugs); cf. Undetermined No. of Unlabeled Cases, 21 F.3d at 1028 
(“The [device] definition does not define the term ‘diagnosis’ nor limit 
diagnostic devices to those used prior to medical treatment.” (quoting 21 
U.S.C. § 321(h)(2))). 
 109. See, e.g., Warning Letters Highlight Differences Between Cosmetics 
and Medical Devices, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://perma.cc/V4AC-D4RH 
(last updated Sept. 11, 2020) (listing examples of products for aesthetic uses 
that the FDA regulates as devices). The FDA’s seemingly contradictory 
positions may result from the agency broadly construing the term “medical.” 
For example, in 1993, the agency explained that it considered drugs intended 
to stop the habit of nailbiting to be intended to prevent disease, because 
nailbiting can make infection more likely. See Nailbiting and Thumbsucking 
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products must have medical uses—narrowly construed—to 
meet the definition of a device, it may not have been necessary 
for Congress to remove software intended for general wellness 
uses from the definition of a device, for example.110 In short, the 
courts’ and the FDA’s occasional reliance on “medical” use as a 
limit on the drug and device definitions is not entirely 
convincing, nor has it yielded a definitive, principled answer as 
to which non-therapeutic uses fall within the drug and device 
definitions, and which do not.111  
 
Deterrent Drug Products for Over-the-Counter Human Use, 58 Fed. Reg. 
46,749, 46,750 (Sept. 2, 1993) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 310.536). It also 
may be that the FDA did not accurately describe its overall policy in the 
documents in which it claimed specific products without medical applications 
were not devices. 
 110. See 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, § 3060, 130 Stat. 
1033, 1130 (2016). 
 111. The FDA’s ability to successfully assert jurisdiction over 
non-therapeutic uses might not be particularly dependent on formal doctrines 
of judicial deference to agencies’ interpretations of their enabling statutes and 
implementing regulations. Cf. Cary Coglianese, Chevron’s Interstitial Steps, 
85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1339, 1344 (2017) (describing Chevron and “the 
emerging criticism of its deference principle”); Christopher J. Walker, 
Attacking Auer and Chevron Deference: A Literature Review, 16 GEO. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 103, 105–18 (2018) (describing the arguments in favor of 
eliminating or narrowing Chevron and Auer deference). For the FDA 
specifically, courts have long deferred to the agency’s interpretations of the 
FDCA. See, e.g., United States v. An Article of Drug . . . Bacto-Unidisk . . . , 
394 U.S. 784, 791–92 (1969); United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 553 
(1979); Premo Pharm. Lab’ys, Inc. v. United States, 629 F.2d 795, 803 (2d Cir. 
1980); cf. Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit 
Courts, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1, 53 (2017) (reporting that the FDA was among the 
agencies to which courts most often deferred); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & 
Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of 
Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 
1120 (2008) (“[T]he Court was highly deferential to agency interpretations 
before Chevron.”); Peter M. Shane, Chevron Deference, the Rule of Law, and 
Presidential Influence in the Administrative State, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 679, 
684 (2014) (“[C]ommentators were hardly unanimous 
in . . . characteriz[ing] . . . Chevron as ‘revolutionary.’”); David Zaring, 
Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135, 143 (2010) (“[C]ourts tend to reverse 
agencies at the same rate regardless of the standard of review they 
apply . . . .”). But see Genus Med. Techs., LLC v. United States Food & Drug 
Admin., 427 F. Supp. 3d 74, 84 (D.D.C. 2019) (declining to defer to the FDA’s 
position that the drug and device definitions are overlapping). Perhaps more 
importantly given the current composition of the Supreme Court, regardless 
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E.  Other Statutory Schemes 
Another ground that courts, and arguably the FDA, have used 
to limit the scope of the FDA’s drug and device jurisdiction is 
that certain non-therapeutic uses are regulated pursuant to 
later-enacted federal statutes other than, and more specific 
than, the FDCA—and thus Congress could not have intended 
the FDA to regulate them.112 One example comes from the 
majority opinion in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp.113 In 1996, before Congress expressly granted FDA 
jurisdiction over tobacco products, the FDA promulgated a rule 
that asserted that nicotine was a drug, intended to affect the 
structure or function of the body, and that the agency had 
authority to regulate cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products 
as drug-delivery devices.114 Four years later, in Brown & 
Williamson, the Supreme Court invalidated the rule on 
statutory interpretation grounds.115 Specifically, a five-judge 
majority concluded that tobacco products were not drugs or 
 
of judicial deference to an agency position, the plain text of the drug and device 
definitions lend themselves to an expansive interpretation. Cf. Charlton C. 
Copeland, Another Explanation of Justice Gorsuch’s Bostock Vote, REGUL. REV. 
(July 22, 2020), https://perma.cc/J2MZ-ZUND (observing that Justice 
Gorsuch’s strict textualism produced an expansive interpretation of Title VII 
protections, contradicting expectations based on political alignment); see also 
Bostock v. Clayton County., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737 (2020) (“When the express 
terms of a statute give us one answer and extratextual considerations suggest 
another, it’s no contest. Only the written word is the law, and all persons are 
entitled to its benefit.”). 
 112.  See, e.g., Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 
529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000). 
 113. Id. 
 114. See generally DAVID KESSLER, A QUESTION OF INTENT: A GREAT 
AMERICAN BATTLE WITH A DEADLY INDUSTRY (2001). A drug-delivery device is a 
kind of combination product. Combination products are products “comprised 
of two or more regulated components, i.e., drug/device, biologic/device, 
drug/biologic, or drug/device/biologic, that are physically, chemically, or 
otherwise combined or mixed and produced as a single entity.” 21 C.F.R. 
§ 3.2(e)(1) (2020). The FDA regulates combination products consistent with its 
“primary mode of action,” which is mode of action that is expected to give the 
greatest contribution to the product’s effects. 21 U.S.C. § 353(g)(1).  
 115. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 133. 
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devices under the FDCA. One reason, among others, that the 
majority offered was that “Congress ha[d] enacted six separate 
pieces of legislation . . . addressing the problem of tobacco use 
and human health,” none of which provided the FDA a role in 
regulating tobacco products.116  
The intersection of the FDA’s jurisdiction with that of the 
Consumer Products Safety Commission (CPSC) offers 
additional examples. For instance, the CPSC’s statutory 
authority over consumer products was one reason the FDA cited 
in 2002 for declining to assert jurisdiction over an implantable 
chip used for non-medical identification purposes.117 As a second 
example, in 2003 the Second Circuit struck down an FDA 
regulation requiring certain child-proof packaging for drugs and 
dietary supplements partly because the Poison Prevention 
Packaging Act “specifically and unambiguously targets the 
accidental poisoning problem” and it is the CPSC—not the 
FDA—that administers that law.118 
This limit on the FDA’s jurisdiction, however, is unlikely to 
clearly exclude all, or perhaps even many, emerging 
non-therapeutic uses.119 Congress has not enacted laws (other 
than the FDCA) that specifically regulate many non-therapeutic 
uses, such as cognitive enhancement technologies, akin to how 
the Brown & Williamson majority described the non-FDCA laws 
that specifically targeted tobacco products.120 Drugs intended 
for recreational uses are one obvious exception. Congress has 
enacted non-FDCA legislation that specifically addresses many 
of these products, through, for example, the federal Controlled 
Substances Act (CSA). But the CSA expressly envisions the 
 
 116. Id. at 143. 
 117.  HUTT ET AL., supra note 56, at 125–28. 
 118.  Nutritional Health All. v. Food & Drug Admin., 318 F.3d 92, 104 (2d 
Cir. 2003). 
 119.  Cf. Noah, supra note 14, at 4 (asserting that the FDA possibly could 
assert jurisdiction over firearms notwithstanding the many non-FDCA federal 
laws specifically governing firearms). 
 120.  Cf. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 133 (describing 
“the tobacco-specific legislation that Congress has enacted”).  
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FDA playing a role in regulating controlled substances.121 Even 
after the enactment of the CSA, the federal government has 
continued to assert that certain substances intended for 
recreational uses are drugs under the FDCA.122 Moreover, to the 
extent that Congress is considering reforming the CSA through 
descheduling certain substances intended for recreational uses, 
it has thus far not seemed to consider exempting such 
substances from the FDCA’s drug definition.123 Thus, even for 
drugs intended for recreational uses that are subject to other 
federal laws, courts may not determine that the FDA lacks 
jurisdiction. 
F.  Safety and Effectiveness 
Yet another, potentially powerful, line of reasoning that has 
been offered to limit the scope of the drug and device definitions 
is the argument that it would be impossible for the FDA to 
determine that non-therapeutic uses of drugs and devices are 
safe and effective. Under this view, the FDCA’s standard for 
demonstrating safety and effectiveness would create an 
effective ban on non-therapeutic uses.124 Thus, if Congress did 
not intend to ban such technologies, it could not have intended 
them to be drugs and devices subject to FDA jurisdiction.  
This argument has been used to limit the scope of FDA 
jurisdiction in two high-profile—and arguably, highly 
politicized—instances. The first again involves the FDA’s 
attempt to assert jurisdiction over tobacco products in 1996 and 
 
 121.  See, e.g., Patricia J. Zettler et al., Implementing A Public Health 
Perspective in FDA Drug Regulation, 73 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 221, 240 (2018). 
 122.  See, e.g., United States v. Travia, 180 F. Supp. 2d 115, 119 (D.D.C. 
2001); cf. Graves v. New York ex rel. O’Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 479 (1939) 
(discussing the idea of congressional acquiescence, where the silence of 
Congress, particularly when it has opportunities to amend a statute, may 
indicate its agreement with a particular statutory interpretation).  
 123.  See, e.g., Marijuana Opportunity Reinvestment and Expungement 
Act of 2020, H.R. 3884, 116th Cong. (2020), https://perma.cc/RD75-UXAS; cf. 
O’Connor & Lietzan, supra note 66 (discussing the FDA’s extensive 
jurisdiction over cannabis intended for medical uses, even after descheduling). 
 124. See, e.g., Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 
529 U.S. 120, 137 (2000). 
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FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. In addition to citing 
the federal laws specifically regulating tobacco products to 
support its conclusion that FDA lacked jurisdiction, the 
majority in Brown & Williamson also reasoned that the FDA 
could not determine tobacco products to be safe and effective, 
and, therefore, FDA oversight would amount to a ban on the 
products.125 Because the majority determined that Congress did 
not intend to ban tobacco products altogether, the majority 
reasoned that Congress could not have intended the FDA to 
regulate tobacco products.126 Notably, the majority reached this 
conclusion without disagreeing that tobacco products are 
intended to affect the structure or function of the body—and 
despite the fact that the FDA itself said that it could find certain 
tobacco products to be safe and effective.127  
The argument that the FDA could not find tobacco products 
to be safe and effective might be persuasive, given the 
well-known harms associated with the products. But this 
reasoning has been extended elsewhere more recently. As states 
increasingly have turned to purchasing substances for lethal 
injection executions that the FDA has not approved,128 states 
have faced legal challenges grounded in arguments that they 
are obtaining drugs in violation of the FDCA.129 Against this 
 
 125. Id. The majority offered several additional reasons, including that 
Congress had enacted more specific statutes to regulate tobacco products as 
noted in Part II.E. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 139. The FDA argued, for example, that tobacco products could 
be viewed as safe and effective because a ban on the addictive products would 
have negative public health effects. See Regulations Restricting the Sale and 
Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and 
Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,397 (Aug. 28, 1996) (to be codified at 21 
C.F.R. pts. 801, 803, 804, 807, 820, 897). 
 128. See, e.g., Seema K. Shah, Experimental Execution, 90 WASH. L. REV. 
147, 173 (2015).  
 129. See, e.g., Cook v. FDA, 733 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2013). States have 
turned to illicit supply chains for various reasons, including that legitimate 
pharmaceutical companies have stopped manufacturing the substances used 
for executions or have stopped being willing to sell substances for executions, 
particularly since the European Union’s 2011 prohibition on trade in “goods 
which could be used for capital punishment.” Commission Implementing 
Regulation 1352/2011, 2011 O.J. (L 338) 31. 
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background, in May 2019 the Department of Justice’s Office of 
Legal Counsel (OLC) issued an opinion—that is binding on 
FDA—asserting that substances intended for human executions 
are not “drugs” within FDA’s authority.130 Among other reasons, 
the OLC explained that such substances cannot be drugs 
because “the regulation of such articles under the FDCA would 
effectively require their prohibition because they could hardly 
be found ‘safe and effective’ for such an intended use.”131 Similar 
to the majority opinion in Brown & Williamson, OLC reached 
this conclusion even though it acknowledged that “[a]rticles 
used in capital punishment do literally ‘affect the structure or 
any function of the body.’”132 Moreover, as OLC also 
acknowledged, the FDA had long regulated substances for 
animal euthanasia as drugs,133 concluding that they are safe 
and effective for that purpose when they “result[] in a humane 
and painless death.”134 
Although this argument regarding safety and effectiveness 
has, so far, been employed in these somewhat limited 
circumstances—for tobacco products and for means of 
execution—it is not difficult to imagine its application to 
emerging markets of non-therapeutic uses that otherwise could 
fall within the drug and device definitions.135 For example, as 
state and local governments decriminalize recreational 
cannabis (and other botanical drugs, such as psychedelic 
mushrooms), arguments that, notwithstanding their effect on 
the body’s function, the FDA should not regulate recreational 
uses of drugs because it cannot assess the safety and 
 
 130. See 2019 OLC Memo, supra note 17, at 1. 
 131. Id. (citing Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 137–39). 
 132. Id. at 10 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(C), (h)(3)).  
 133. See id. at 15 n.9. 
 134. Compliance Policy Guide § 650.100 Animal Drugs for Euthanasia, 
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Mar. 1995), https://perma.cc/3PQQ-JWTX. 
 135. Cf. Noah, supra note 14, at 37 (considering pathways to marketing a 
‘safe and effective’ firearm, if the FDA asserted jurisdiction over firearms as 
devices). 
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effectiveness are likely to emerge.136 As another example, 
companies are increasingly showing interest in developing brain 
stimulation machines or brain-computer interfaces to enhance 
cognitive function rather than to treat disorders like depression, 
and commentators have begun to raise questions about whether 
FDA could consider such technologies to be safe and effective.137 
Accordingly, assessing the validity of safety and effectiveness as 
a limit on the drug and device definitions is useful for 
understanding the regulatory landscape for new markets and 
technologies. 
III.  EVALUATING THE SAFETY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF 
NON-THERAPEUTIC USES 
This Part argues for skepticism about limiting the FDA’s 
jurisdiction based on arguments that the FDA could never 
determine that non-therapeutic uses are safe and effective. As a 
descriptive matter, such arguments will rarely be correct. The 
FDA assesses drug and device uses on a case-by-case basis, and 
the FDCA and FDA regulations give the agency tremendous 
flexibility in determining what evidence is needed to 
demonstrate that the benefits of a particular use outweigh its 
risks.138 Moreover, a careful review demonstrates that the 
agency has a not-insubstantial track record of evaluating the 
safety and effectiveness of non-therapeutic uses and has not 
judged those non-therapeutic uses to be without significant 
benefits.139 This is not to say that the agency treats therapeutic 
 
 136. Cf. Benton Bodamer (@TripleB_Esq), TWITTER (Jan. 30, 2020 10:14 
PM), https://perma.cc/5EFJ-2R9U (showing a tweet from an attorney with 
expertise in cannabis raising a similar concern about psychedelic mushrooms). 
 137. See, e.g., Nick Statt, Elon Musk Launches Neuralink, a Venture to 
Merge the Human Brain with AI, VERGE (Mar. 27, 2017, 4:10 PM), https://
perma.cc/FGJ5-PJML; Lucille M. Tournas & Walter G. Johnson, Elon Musk 
Wants to Hack Your Brain, SLATE (Aug. 5, 2019, 7:30 AM), https://perma.cc
/MXH9-8JSK. 
 138. See Merrill, supra note 91, at 1782 (“FDA exercises effectively 
unchallengeable authority to dictate the number and kinds of studies required 
to support approval and nearly unreviewable discretion to interpret the 
results.”). 
 139. See infra Part III.B.  
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and non-therapeutic uses identically—there are instances, such 
as with silicone breast implants, when the agency was willing 
to authorize therapeutic uses when it did not authorize 
non-therapeutic ones.140 But, for non-therapeutic uses, the 
agency is more tolerant of serious risks, including risks of death, 
and relatively lower benefits than might be expected.141 
A.  Flexible Statutory Standards 
The FDA’s role in approving drugs and devices is, perhaps, 
the most well-known way that it evaluates products’ safety and 
effectiveness. For drugs, this approval authority applies to “new 
drugs”142 that are not “generally recognized . . . as safe and 
effective,”143 including in the FDA’s view most, if not all, 
prescription drugs as well as certain over-the-counter (OTC) 
drugs.144 Devices undergo more varied forms of premarket 
review than drugs do, with the type of review typically 
depending on the level of risk posed by a device and its 
novelty.145 The highest risk, “class III” devices—such as 
 
 140. See Mehlman, supra note 24, at 702. 
 141. Cf. id. at 699–703 (“[E]ither . . . the [FDA] feels that the risks posed 
by saline implants are so small that they are outweighed by cosmetic as well 
as by therapeutic benefits, or . . . the agency simply has not come to grips with 
the enhancement/therapy distinction.”).  
 142. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a).  
 143. Id. § 321(p). 
 144. General recognition of safety and effectiveness is a high bar to clear 
that requires at least as much evidence of safety and effectiveness as FDA 
approval does. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Hynson, Wescott & Dunning, Inc., 412 
U.S. 609, 629 (1973). In addition, to fall outside of the definition of a “new 
drug” a drug must have been marketed to a material extent and for a material 
time—which the FDA generally interprets as requiring that the drug has been 
legally marketed in sufficient quantities, for example in another country, for 
at least five years. See 21 U.S.C. 321(p)(2); U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: TIME AND EXTENT APPLICATIONS FOR 
NONPRESCRIPTION DRUG PRODUCTS 6 (2011), https://perma.cc/45SZ-S8S2 
(PDF). 
 145. See Merrill, supra note 91, at 1109–11 (describing the different forms 
of premarket review that apply to different device classifications based on risk 
profile); W. Nicholson Price, II, Regulating Black-Box Medicine, 116 MICH. L. 
REV. 421, 438 (2017) (same). 
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pacemakers and implanted brain stimulators—typically require 
FDA approval.146  
The precise language of the statutory standards for 
approving new drugs under a new drug application (NDA) and 
devices under a premarket approval application (PMA) differ.147 
But the general idea is the same: to approve a use of new drug 
or device, the FDA must determine that the product is safe and 
effective for its proposed indication and that the proposed 
labeling is not false or misleading.148 Because drugs and devices 
 
 146. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C). 
 147. Compare id. § 355(d) (describing grounds for refusing to approve a 
new drug application), with id. § 360e(d)(2) (describing grounds for refusing 
premarket approval of a device). Specifically, the drug approval standard 
requires, among other things, “adequate tests” to show the drug is safe and 
“substantial evidence” of effectiveness, demonstrated through “adequate and 
well-controlled investigations.” Id. § 355(d). The device approval standard 
requires “reasonable assurance” of safety and effectiveness consisting of “one 
or more” “well-controlled investigations” or other “valid scientific evidence.” 
Id. §§ 360c(a)(3), 360e(d). Whether these standards are the same—or instead, 
the device standard is a lower one—in practice and as a statutory 
interpretation matter, is debated. See Peter Barton Hutt et al., The Standard 
of Evidence Required for Premarket Approval Under the Medical Device 
Amendments of 1976, 47 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 605, 608–09 (1992) (“Congress 
intended medical device manufacturers seeking premarket approval to be 
subject to a different, more flexible, standard of evidence of safety and 
effectiveness than new drug sponsors.”); Merrill, supra note 91, at 1821–23 
(arguing that Congress did not intend the device model to mimic the drug 
model but acknowledging the FDA’s post-1993 policy shift toward equally 
rigorous expectations for approval of both drugs and devices). 
 148. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(d). This Article focuses on drugs approved under 
“new drug applications” (NDAs) pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1), which are 
often thought of as “brand-name” drugs. The FDA also approves generic new 
drugs through a separate, abbreviated process. See id. § 355(j). As with other 
FDA authorization processes, FDA review and approval of abbreviated new 
drug applications (ANDAs) is intended to assure the safety and effectiveness 
of the drugs. See id. § 355(j). This goal, however, is accomplished by 
demonstrating that the generic drug is the same as the brand-name drug (with 
a few minor exceptions not related to safety and effectiveness). From that 
similarity, the safety and effectiveness of the generic drug can be inferred. See 
id. Thus, by the time the FDA would evaluate an ANDA for a non-therapeutic 
use, the agency would have already made the determination most relevant to 
this Article—the initial determination that the non-therapeutic use is safe and 
effective when it approved the brand-name drug for that use. Cf. Eric Biber & 
J.B. Ruhl, The Permit Power Revisited: The Theory and Practice of Regulatory 
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cannot be completely risk-free (and are not equally effective for 
all people), “safe and effective” generally means that the 
benefits of the product’s intended use outweigh its risks.149 The 
FDCA requires that the drug or device manufacturer submit to 
the FDA numerous kinds of information showing that this 
approval standard is met, which typically consists of data from 
one or two well-designed clinical trials.150 Once a use of a drug 
or device is approved the FDA’s weighing of its risks and 
benefits does not end. The FDA also regulates marketed 
products, including having the authority to withdraw an 
approval if the agency determines that the benefits of the 
product’s uses no longer outweigh its risks—perhaps because 
new risk information comes to light, as can happen once a 
product is used widely and outside of a controlled research 
environment.151  
Although this overview makes safety and effectiveness 
determinations sound straightforward, there is inevitably 
uncertainty in scientific evidence and making benefit-risk 
determinations inherently involves certain value judgments.152 
Perhaps for this reason, the FDCA, at least arguably, gives the 
FDA substantial discretion to decide what evidence is sufficient 
 
Permits in the Administrative State, 64 DUKE L.J. 133, 190 (2014) (describing 
the ANDA process as an example of the government’s permitting power). 
 149. See generally Erika Lietzan & Patricia J. Zettler, Regulating 
Medicines in the United States, in OXFORD HANDBOOK ON COMPARATIVE 
HEALTH LAW (David Orentlicher & Tamara Hervey eds., Oxford Univ. Press 
2020).  
 150. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d). 
 151. See id. § 355(e) (describing the bases upon which the Secretary may 
withdraw approval of a new drug application in light of information discovered 
later); id. § 360e(e) (same with respect to devices); 21 C.F.R. § 814.46 (2020) 
(allowing for withdrawal of premarket approval for devices pursuant to 21 
U.S.C. § 360e(e)). 
 152. See Efthimios Parasidis et al., Assessing COVID-19 Emergency Use 
Authorizations, FOOD & DRUG L.J. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 163) (on 
file with author) (making a similar point); cf. Eli Y. Adashi et al., When Science 
and Politics Collide: Enhancing the FDA, 364 SCI. 628, 630 (2019) 
(“Determining the basic facts about safety, efficacy, or adverse events 
reporting should be science-driven and as apolitical as possible.”); Craig J. 
Konnoth, Drugs’ Other Side Effects, 105 IOWA L. REV. 171, 206–07 (2019) 
(noting that FDA is a “political entity”). 
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to show that the benefits of a particular use of a drug or device 
outweigh its risks.153 For example, in its regulations regarding 
new drug approvals, the FDA states that it must “exercise its 
scientific judgment to determine the kind and quantity of data 
and information an applicant is required to provide for a 
particular drug to meet the statutory standards [for safety and 
effectiveness].”154  
Consistent with the wide discretion granted to the FDA in 
the statute and implementing regulations, the FDA has 
determined that varying kinds of evidence are sufficient (or not) 
to demonstrate safety and effectiveness of different uses of 
drugs and devices, and varying kinds of risks and benefits 
produce favorable (or not) benefit-risk ratios.155 One 
controversial example was the FDA’s 2016 decision to approve 
Exondys 51 (eteplirsen) for Duchenne muscular dystrophy, a 
severe form of the disease that almost exclusively affects boys 
and is associated with life expectancies only into patients’ 
twenties.156 The FDA approved Exondys 51 based on an 
uncontrolled trial in just twelve patients, and against the 
recommendation of the agency’s Peripheral and Central 
Nervous System Drugs Advisory Committee.157  This decision 
 
 153. Merrill, supra note 91, at 1782; cf. Konnoth, supra note 152, at 173– 74 
(arguing that FDA should take a broad approach to the evidence relevant to 
its approval decision).  
 154. 21 C.F.R. § 314.105(c) (2020). 
 155. See, e.g., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FACTORS TO CONSIDER WHEN 
MAKING BENEFIT-RISK DETERMINATIONS IN MEDICAL DEVICE PREMARKET 
APPROVAL AND DE NOVO CLASSIFICATIONS: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD 
AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF, (2019), https://perma.cc/N2A7-9JYL (PDF); 
Wallach et al., supra note 18, at 220. 
 156. See Duchenne and Becker Muscular Dystrophy, MEDLINEPLUS, 
https://perma.cc/C9P4-8V7P (last updated Aug. 18, 2020). 
 157. See, e.g., Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jerry Avorn, Approving a 
Problematic Muscular Dystrophy Drug: Implications for FDA Policy, 316 
JAMA 2357, 2357 (2016). It is worth noting that, in the wake of seemingly 
unprecedented political interference with FDA decision-making during the 
COVID-19 pandemic, see, for example, Parasidis et al., supra note 152, at 165, 
the process that the FDA followed in approving Exondys 51 has, in some ways, 
aged well. Specifically, the highest-ranking relevant career official determined 
the drug would be approved, over the objection of other career staff. The FDA 
Commissioner, a political appointee, let that decision stand partly because of 
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caused strong disagreement within the agency,158 as well as 
vocal criticism from scholars.159 Even among critics of the 
decision, however, few, if any, argued that the FDA failed to 
comply with the FDCA in determining that Exondys 51 met the 
safety and effectiveness standard for approval.  
B.  Applying the Standards to Non-Therapeutic Uses 
The following four examples (two drug and two device)—
although not exhaustive—demonstrate how the FDA has 
applied the flexible statutory standards for safety and 
effectiveness when approving non-therapeutic uses.160 These 
 
a strong norm within the agency that career staff, rather than political staff, 
typically make these decisions. See Memorandum from Robert M. Califf, 
Comm’r of Food & Drugs, to Janet Woodcock, Dir, CDER 2 (Sept. 16, 2016), 
available at https://perma.cc/7A7M-XLHE [hereinafter EXONDYS 51 MEMO]. 
 158. See, e.g., EXONDYS 51 MEMO, supra note 157, at 17. 
 159. See, e.g., Kesselheim & Avorn, supra note 157, at 2357; see also 
Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Deborah B. Leiderman, Cannabis for Medical Use: 
FDA and DEA Regulation in the Hall of Mirrors, 74 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 246, 
279 n.191 (2019) (describing the Exondys 51 approval as “controversial”); 
Jordan Paradise, Three Framings of “Faster” at the FDA and the Federal Right 
to Try, 11 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 53, 81 (2020) (describing the 
“controversial” Exondys 51 approval and explaining that “[i]n a stunningly 
similar manner, the FDA recently approved . . . a second DMD drug from 
Sarepta [the Exondys 51 manufacturer], in December 2019”). 
 160. These examples focus on new drug applications and premarket 
approval applications, where the FDCA standards for safety and effectiveness 
are most relevant for this Article’s analysis. Most legally marketed devices, 
however, are not FDA-approved. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., 
GAO-09-190, MEDICAL DEVICES: FDA SHOULD TAKE STEPS TO ENSURE THAT 
HIGH-RISK DEVICE TYPES ARE APPROVED THROUGH THE MOST STRINGENT 
PREMARKET REVIEW PROCESS 6 (2009). Instead, manufacturers of low-risk 
devices generally do not have any premarket notification requirements, while 
manufacturers of moderate risk devices—class II devices, the class into which 
most devices fall—frequently obtain FDA “clearance” for marketing their 
devices by submitting an application known as a “510(k).” A 510(k) 
demonstrates that a manufacturer’s device is “substantially equivalent” to a 
device already on the market—it has the same intended use and the same 
technological characteristics as a “predicate device,” which allows the FDA to 
infer that the new device is as safe and effective as the currently marketed 
one. See, e.g., Ralph F. Hall & Michelle Mercer, Rethinking Lohr: Does “SE” 
Mean Safe and Effective, Substantially Equivalent, or Both?, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI. 
& TECH. 737, 753–54 (2012) (describing the process for showing substantial 
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examples suggest both that the agency has accepted varied 
evidence as showing safety and effectiveness of non-therapeutic 
uses, and that agency review is not an insurmountable obstacle 
to marketing non-therapeutic uses. 
1.  Hair Growth Drugs 
Hair growth drugs—first approved roughly thirty years 
ago, when the FDA approved Rogaine161—provide examples of 
lucrative non-therapeutic uses, which the FDA approved based 
on relatively minimal evidence of effectiveness or despite 
relatively serious risks. When the FDA first approved Rogaine, 
its active ingredient, minoxidil, was already approved at the 
time—but for a therapeutic use (hypertension) and in a tablet, 
rather than topical form.162 It was through developing the 
therapeutic use of minoxidil, when subjects in clinical trials 
began to experience hair growth, that the manufacturer, The 
Upjohn Company (Upjohn), came to learn that the drug may 
have the potential to address hair loss as well.163  
 
equivalence). It is through 510(k) process, for example, that the FDA has 
authorized the marketing of certain decorative contact lenses. See, e.g., 
DECORATIVE LENSES GUIDANCE, supra note 4, at 3. 
 161. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Rogaine Approval History, https://
perma.cc/74U4-6VMQ (detailing Rogaine’s approval history). Although hair 
loss can be a result of medical problems or treatments, such as low thyroid 
conditions or chemotherapy drugs, and in such circumstances may be viewed 
as a medical problem, the drugs approved for regrowing hair do not improve 
or prevent such hair loss according to their FDA-approved labeling. Cf. EEOC 
v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1219 n.2 (D. Minn. 2001) 
(concluding that a health plan’s decision to exclude Propecia was unlike its 
decision to exclude hormonal birth control pills because Propecia is a 
“non-medically necessary and elective treatment[]”). 
 162. See Loniten Approval History, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://
perma.cc/RW6V-USX8; see also W. Nicholson Price, II, Making Do in Making 
Drugs: Innovation Policy and Pharmaceutical Manufacturing, 55 B.C. L. REV. 
491, 562 n.229 (2014) (discussing minoxidil’s patent history). For a discussion 
of how new uses for already authorized products are developed, see Erika 
Lietzan, Paper Promises for Drug Innovation, 26 GEO. MASON L. REV. 168, 
171– 77 (2018). 
 163. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. Riahom Corp., 641 F. Supp. 1209, 1212 (D. 
Del. 1986). 
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Presumably because the tablet form of minoxidil was 
associated with serious cardiovascular adverse effects and a 
systemic effect of the drug was not needed for hair growth,164 
Upjohn sought to develop a topical version.165 Upjohn spent 
three years conducting clinical trials, which ultimately showed 
that 26 percent of men using the topical formulation reported 
“moderate to dense hair regrowth” at four months, compared to 
11 percent in the placebo groups.166 In studies of women taking 
the drug, 19 percent reported moderate hair growth at 8 
months, compared to 7 percent in the placebo group.167  
Although those numbers do not seem particularly 
impressive, the risks associated with the topical version of 
minoxidil—scalp irritation being the most common one—are not 
particularly serious.168 And the FDA determined that the 
benefits of topical minoxidil outweighed its risks, ultimately 
approving it to regrow hair on the scalp in 1988 for men and in 
1991 for women, as a prescription drug.169 Likely partly because 
of its relatively minor risks, the FDA approved an application to 
switch Rogaine to over-the-counter status in 1996.170 
The FDA originally approved the other leading hair 
regrowth drug—a tablet called Propecia—in 1997.171 As with 
 
 164. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., LONITEN LABELING (2015), https://
perma.cc/A53S-2YRH (PDF) (containing the FDA’s minoxidil labeling data). 
 165. See Upjohn, 641 F. Supp. at 1213. 
 166. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., ROGAINE LABELING (2005), https://
perma.cc/LP9V-747R (PDF); see also Upjohn, 641 F. Supp. at 1213 (describing 
the time and money that Upjohn spent on developing Rogaine). Since the 
original formulation was approved, a stronger formulation has been approved 
for which studies have shown increased effectiveness. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., NDA 20-834 (1997), https://perma.cc/PVX9-64BH (PDF). 
 167. See ROGAINE LABELING, supra note 166. 
 168. See id. 
 169. See, e.g., Will Lester, Hair-Raising Tale: No Fame for Men Who 
Discovered Rogaine, DAILY GAZETTE (May 13, 1996), at A6. 
 170. See Rogaine Approval History, supra note 161. For a discussion of 
some of the business reasons that manufacturers may follow this pattern of 
first marketing a drug as a prescription-only, and later requesting a switch to 
OTC status, see Valerie Junod, Drug Marketing Exclusivity Under United 
States and European Union Law, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 479, 514 (2004).  
 171. See Propecia Approval History, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://
perma.cc/3EGX-DUFY. 
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Rogaine, the active ingredient in Propecia, finasteride, had been 
previously approved for a therapeutic use: for treating enlarged 
prostates causing urinary and other problems in men.172 The 
therapeutic version of finasteride, however, was approved at a 
dosage five times higher than was needed for the hair growth 
indication and Merck, the manufacturer, sought approval of a 
lower dose for hair growth in men.173   
Propecia’s effectiveness was demonstrated in three 
randomized, controlled, blinded clinical trials of men with 
moderate to mild hair loss, looking at subjects’ hair counts and 
self-assessments.174 The trials showed that men using Propecia 
were rated as having significantly more hair on both measures 
than were the men using the placebo—for example, at twelve 
months, 65 percent of men using Propecia were rated as having 
increased growth compared to 37 percent of men in the placebo 
group.175 Propecia is, however, associated with significant risks. 
At the time of its original approval, the drug was known to be 
associated with risks to male fetuses if taken by pregnant 
women and with effects on Prostate-Specific Antigen levels, 
 
 172. See Proscar Approval History, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://
perma.cc/9YU9-B3GN; see also Lars Noah, This Is Your Products Liability 
Restatement on Drugs, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 839, 874–75 (2009) (“[O]ne decade 
later, the totality of published research continues to support the widespread 
use of this still-approved drug for treating [enlarged prostate].”). A third drug, 
dutasteride, was approved shortly after finasteride for a similar therapeutic 
purpose. See Avodart Approval History, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://
perma.cc/B38X-C8ZQ. Although studies have suggested dutasteride may be 
effective for hair growth in men, it is not approved for that indication. See, e.g., 
Elise A. Olson et al., The Importance of Dual 5a-Reductase Inhibition in the 
Treatment of Male Pattern Hair Loss: Results of a Randomized 
Placebo-Controlled Study of Dutasteride Versus Finasteride, 55 J. AM. ACAD. 
DERMATOLOGY 1014, 1022–23 (2006). 
 173. See Noah, supra note 172, at 875 (describing the history of Propecia’s 
development and noting the risks associated with pill splitting). The higher 
dose of finasteride is associated with certain risks, such as an increased risk 
of breast cancer in men, that the lower dose is not known to be. See Steve T. 
Bird et al., Male Breast Cancer and 5 -Reductase Inhibitors Finasteride and 
Dutasteride, 190 J. UROLOGY 1811, 1811 (2013).  
 174. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PROPECIA LABELING (2014), https://
perma.cc/5543-YPPU (PDF). 
 175. See id. 
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which are used to screen for prostate cancer.176 In 2011, it 
became known that the drug is also associated with an increased 
risk of high-grade prostate cancer.177 Despite these risks, the 
FDA approved, and has not withdrawn its approval of, 
finasteride for hair loss—instead choosing to mitigate the risks 
through approving the drug only for men, including warnings in 
the FDA-approved labeling, and continuing to require a 
prescription for the drug.178 
In addition to the differences in the formulations between 
the therapeutic and non-therapeutic versions of minoxidil 
(Rogaine’s active ingredient) and finasteride (Propecia’s active 
ingredient), the manufacturers likely sought approval of the 
hair loss indications—rather than simply relying on off-label 
use—because they wanted to actively promote those indications. 
Rogaine’s initial approval in 1988 came shortly after the FDA’s 
policies on direct-to-consumer (DTC) advertising of prescription 
drugs became more permissive.179 Rogaine’s manufacturer, 
Upjohn, then began one of the first DTC “disease awareness” 
advertising campaigns,180 which featured individuals describing 
the “problems” associated with hair loss (e.g., “Can an emerging 
bald spot . . . damage your ability to get along with others, 
 
 176. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., NDA 20-834 APPROVAL PACKAGE (1997) 
https://perma.cc/S85B-PVC8 (PDF). 
 177. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PROPECIA (LABELING (2011), https://
perma.cc/DJ4S-BQX3 (PDF). Concerns about other risks associated with the 
drug, such as erectile dysfunction and depression, have also been raised. See, 
e.g., Dan Levine, Court Let Merck Hide Secrets about a Popular Drug’s Risks, 
REUTERS (Feb. 11, 2019), https://perma.cc/59KG-357H. 
 178. See id.  
 179. See Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Prescription Drugs; 
Withdrawal of Moratorium (Notice), 50 Fed. Reg. 36,677, 36,678 (Sept. 9, 
1985); see also Wayne L. Pines, A History and Perspective on 
Direct-to-Consumer Promotion, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 489, 493 (1999) 
(describing how companies undertook more aggressive “help-seeking” 
advertisements after the FDA lifted restrictions in 1985). 
 180. See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism 
Seriously: Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420, 
1456 (1999); see also Lars Noah, Advertising Prescription Drugs to Consumers: 
Assessing the Regulatory and Liability Issues, 32 GA. L. REV. 141, 142 n.4 
(1997) (elaborating on the pharmaceutical industry’s efforts to promote drugs 
directly to consumers). 
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influence your chances of obtaining a job or a date or even 
interfere with your job performance?”) and suggested that 
consumers talk with their physicians about their hair loss.181 
Upjohn’s campaign apparently worked—Rogaine became a 
widely sold drug, with global revenue estimated at 1.2 billion 
dollars in 2015.182 Likewise, Propecia was widely and 
successfully promoted DTC, becoming the second most highly 
promoted DTC prescription drug within just a few years of 
approval and reaching roughly 400 million dollars in sales per 
year before generic versions entered the market.183  
2.  Botox 
The regulatory history for Botox (onabotulinumtoxinA) is 
similar to that for Rogaine and Propecia in many ways, although 
the risks of Botox are arguably more serious than those 
associated with either Rogaine or Propecia. Botox was originally 
approved as a prescription drug for therapeutic uses—the first 
approved indication was for treating adult eye muscle 
movement disorders.184 After over ten years on the market as an 
approved therapy,185 in 2002, the FDA approved Botox, under 
the brand-name “Botox Cosmetic,” for “the temporary 
 
 181. Teresa Moran Schwartz, Consumer-Directed Prescription Drug 
Advertising and the Learned Intermediary Rule, 46 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 829, 
837 (1991).  
 182. Minoxidil Market Insights, GLOB. MKT. INSIGHTS (Nov. 2018), https://
perma.cc/NY28-XYDK. 
 183. See Pines, supra note 179, at 507–08; Jim Edwards, Why Merck’s Hair 
Loss Drug Could Make Its Income Statement Go, Um, Limp, CBS NEWS (Jan. 
13, 2011, 5:11 PM), https://perma.cc/874A-ZPE4. 
 184. See Botox Approval History, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://
perma.cc/4S2K-E3KL. 
 185. See id. Following its original approval, the FDA approved Botox for 
additional therapeutic uses, including cervical dystonia in 2000, and then after 
Botox Cosmetic’s approval, severe primary axillary hyperhidrosis in 2004, 
upper limb spasticity and the prevention of headaches in patients with chronic 
migraines in 2010, urinary incontinence in 2011, overactive bladder in 2013, 
and lower limb spasticity in 2016. See id.  
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improvement in the appearance of moderate to severe glabellar 
lines” (i.e., frown lines between the eyebrows).186 
Botox’s use for this purpose is fairly intuitive—it is a 
neurotoxin that blocks nerve signals telling muscles to move, 
and muscle contractions cause wrinkles.187 And the FDA’s 2002 
approval of Botox for glabellar lines was supported by seemingly 
robust evidence of effectiveness. Allergan,188 Botox’s 
manufacturer, conducted two randomized, double-blind, placebo 
controlled clinical trials, including a total of 537 subjects with 
moderate to severe frown lines.189 The subjects were given Botox 
Cosmetic (or placebo) and rated thirty days later—by 
themselves and the researchers—on the severity of their 
wrinkles.190 Significantly more subjects who received Botox 
Cosmetic were rated as having no lines or only mild lines at 
thirty days (roughly 80 percent versus 3 percent).191  
As a neurotoxin, however, Botox is also associated with 
serious risks. At the time that the FDA first approved Botox for 
wrinkles, the drug’s FDA-approved labeling including warnings 
about rare cardiovascular adverse events, including potentially 
fatal ones, as well as the transmission of viral diseases such as 
Creutzfeld-Jakob disease (CJD), a degenerative, fatal brain 
 
 186. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 2002 BOTOX LABELING 2 (2002), https://
perma.cc/4GWH-VN5L (PDF). Indicative, perhaps, of the porous line between 
therapeutic and non-therapeutic uses, although the indication on the 
FDA-approved labeling does not use therapeutic terms, in the approval letter, 
the agency described the approved use as the “treatment of glabellar lines.” 
Botox Cosmetic Approval Letter, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Apr. 12, 2002), 
https://perma.cc/QWD4-UBZ7 (last updated Apr. 14, 2002) (emphasis added).  
 187. See, e.g., 2002 BOTOX LABELING, supra note 186, at 1. 
 188. Allergan is the manufacturer of many other aesthetic drugs and 
devices, including a dermal filler marketed as Juvederm, see infra Part II.A.4, 
as well as others not discussed in detail in this Article, such as Latisse, a 
prescription drug approved for eyelash growth and Kybella, a prescription 
drug approved for eliminating fat in the chin (i.e., eliminating a “double chin”). 
See, e.g., Meg Tirrell (@megtirrell), TWITTER (Sept. 14, 2018, 6:21 AM), https://
perma.cc/6TJB-F37R (describing Allergan’s “medical aesthetics day” 
conference). 
 189. See 2002 BOTOX LABELING, supra note 186, at 2.  
 190. See id.  
 191. See id. at 3 (noting p<.001).   
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disorder.192 Since that original approval, additional risks have 
become known—including that Botox may spread from the site 
of injection to other areas of the body, producing symptoms of 
botulism, such as breathing difficulties that are potentially 
fatal.193 One way the FDA manages these risks is by requiring 
a prescription for Botox.194 Additionally, after the FDA received 
new authority in 2007 to require Risk Evaluation and 
Mitigation Strategies (REMS) for prescription drugs that pose 
the most serious risks, the agency required a REMS for Botox 
for both its therapeutic and non-therapeutic uses, which 
consisted primarily of patient labeling until the REMS 
requirement was released in 2012.195 The drug’s labeling also 
includes a “black box warning” about its fatal risks—the kind of 
warning that the FDA reserves for the most serious risks 
associated with drugs.196 None of the risks of Botox, however—
including the potentially fatal ones—have led the FDA to 
decline to approve, or withdraw approval of, the use of Botox for 
glabellar lines.  
Moreover, these risks did not lead the FDA to decline to 
approve two additional non-therapeutic uses for Botox—lateral 
canthal lines (i.e., crow’s feet) in 2013 and forehead lines in 
 
 192. See id. at 9. 
 193. See, e.g., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 2009 BOTOX LABELING 1 (2009), 
https://perma.cc/5BDH-6KT8 (PDF) . 
 194. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., BOTOX LABELING 1 (2020), https://
perma.cc/TQW6-MCWC (PDF) (detailing prescription requirements). 
 195. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., BOTOX APPROVAL LETTER 2–3 (2009), 
https://perma.cc/GJP2-B4PS (PDF). The decision to release the REMS 
requirement for Botox was consistent with the agency’s policy decision, at the 
time, to stop requiring REMS that primarily consist of patient labeling. But 
patient labeling, known as a Medication Guide, is still required for Botox. See 
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., BOTOX RELEASE REMS REQUIREMENT LETTER 2 
(2012), https://perma.cc/5JG4-AUGW (PDF); U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
GUIDANCE: MEDICATION GUIDES—DISTRIBUTION AND INCLUSION IN RISK 
EVALUATION AND MITIGATION STRATEGIES (REMS), 2–6 (2011), https://perma.cc
/BRF6-D2ZH (PDF). 
 196. See 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(c) (2020); U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE 
FOR INDUSTRY: WARNINGS AND PRECAUTIONS, CONTRAINDICATIONS, AND BOXED 
WARNING SECTIONS OF LABELING FOR HUMAN PRESCRIPTION DRUG AND 
BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS CONTENT AND FORMAT 2 (2011), https://perma.cc/9NBH-
ZNNN (PDF).  
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2017—for which the effectiveness data are similar to that for 
glabellar lines.197 Although health care professionals could, and 
undoubtedly did, provide Botox for these purposes before the 
FDA approvals, Allergan, nevertheless, undertook the clinical 
trials necessary to assess the drug’s safety and effectiveness for 
these uses, to obtain the FDA’s approval.198 That investment—
as well as DTC advertising campaigns, which recently have 
begun to target men as well as women—seemingly has paid 
off.199 By 2006, yearly sales of Botox were over $1 billion with 
approximately half due to cosmetic uses.200 By 2013, yearly sales 
were over $2 billion and the continued pursuit of new uses for 
Botox was perceived as a key driver of Allergan’s overall 
value.201 
3.  Breast Implants 
Breast implants provide an example of devices that the 
FDA has approved for a non-therapeutic use, and the long, 
controversial regulatory history—particularly for silicone 
breast implants—offers a few insights into the FDA’s approach 
to non-therapeutic uses.202 Although breast implants have been 
 
 197. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., BOTOX APPROVAL LETTER 1 (2013), 
https://perma.cc/D9FJ-9XS2 (PDF); U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., BOTOX 
APPROVAL LETTER 1 (2017), https://perma.cc/TNV9-TKAX (PDF).  
 198. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 2013 BOTOX LABELING 10 (2013), 
https://perma.cc/YC7V-ZKEL (PDF). It is, perhaps, worth noting that Allergan 
challenged the FDA’s policies restricting off-label promotion of Botox on First 
Amendment grounds, although Allergan withdrew its lawsuit as part of a 
settlement. See Complaint at 26–38, Allergan v. United States, No. 09-01879 
(D.D.C. Oct. 14, 2010) (dismissed per stipulation). 
 199. See Aliko Carter, Deion Sanders Loves BOTOX and Is Getting His 
Message Out to Men, FORBES (Jan. 15, 2018), https://perma.cc/H2PB-PGU6. 
 200. See Emilia Petrarca, On the 15th Anniversary of Botox, an 
Appreciation of How It’s Changed Everyone, W MAG. (Apr. 14, 2017), https://
perma.cc/49YS-K6VQ.  
 201. See Joseph Walker, Botox Itself Aims Not to Age, WALL ST. J. (May 18, 
2014), https://perma.cc/KNC6-5QKH. 
 202. See, e.g., MARCIA ANGELL, SCIENCE ON TRIAL: THE CLASH OF MEDICAL 
EVIDENCE AND THE LAW IN THE BREAST IMPLANT CASE, 54–57 (1996); Dresser et 
al., supra note 7, at 706; David E. Bernstein, The Breast Implant Fiasco, 87 
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on the market since the early 1960s, Congress did not create the 
modern scheme for FDA regulation of devices until 1976 and the 
FDA did not require breast implant manufacturers to submit 
PMAs until 1991.203 Today there are over two hundred PMAs 
approved for breast implants.204 Like hair growth drugs and 
Botox, the FDA has approved breast implants for both 
therapeutic and non-therapeutic uses—but for breast implants 
the agency has more clearly appeared to weigh the value of the 
product’s therapeutic and non-therapeutic benefits 
differently.205 
The FDA approved the first PMAs for breast implants in 
2000.206 The applications covered saline breast implants 
intended both for aesthetic uses and for therapeutic 
reconstruction following medically necessary mastectomies.207 
At the time of approval, the FDA judged the implants—whether 
intended for aesthetic or reconstructive purposes—to be 
associated with various risks, including serious risks such as the 
need for additional surgery over the course of the recipient’s 
life.208 The FDA, however, judged the benefits of both the 
aesthetic and reconstructive uses to outweigh these risks, 
provided certain conditions—such as conducting a ten-year 
post-approval follow-up study—were met.209 
 
CAL. L. REV. 457, 459–60 (1999); Regulatory History of Breast Implants in the 
U.S., supra note 11. 
 203. See Regulatory History of Breast Implants in the U.S., supra note 11. 
 204. See Premarket Approval (PMA) Database, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
https://perma.cc/JA4L-L2LX (last updated Oct. 12, 2020) (yielding roughly 230 
approved applications when searching for “breast implant” in the FDA’s PMA 
database). 
 205. See, e.g., Mehlman, supra note 24, at 702. 
 206. See Regulatory History of Breast Implants in the U.S., supra note 11. 
 207. See id. Allergan, the manufacturer of Botox, was also the 
manufacturer of one of the first approved breast implants. See Premarket 
Approval of Natrelle Saline Breast Implants, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
https://perma.cc/F2FX-YTHL (last updated Oct. 19, 2020).  
 208. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., SUMMARY OF SAFETY AND 
EFFECTIVENESS DATA OF SALINE-FILLED MAMMARY PROSTHESIS 4 (2000), https://
perma.cc/ZX5A-CYT2 (PDF). 
 209. See, e.g., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., NATRELLE APPROVAL ORDER 1 
(2000), https://perma.cc/E64E-XG74 (PDF).  
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This is not to say that the agency judged the benefits of 
non-therapeutic uses as equal to those of therapeutic uses. Until 
2006, the FDA authorized only the reconstructive, but not the 
aesthetic, use of silicone breast implants—which at the time 
were thought to be associated with risks greater than those 
associated with saline implants.210 This different approach 
likely reflected the FDA’s view that that those potential greater 
risks were outweighed by reconstructive but not aesthetic 
benefits.211   
4.  Dermal Fillers 
As with breast implants, the FDA—since the early 1980s—
has approved as devices dozens of dermal fillers, under 
brand-names such as Restylane and Juvederm.212 Dermal fillers 
typically consistent of materials such as collagen or hyaluronic 
acid that are injected into the body to smooth wrinkles or add 
volume to the skin.213 Although dermal fillers are injectable 
products, they are regulated as devices, rather than drugs, 
 
 210. See Regulatory History of Breast Implants in the U.S., supra note 11; 
see also Mehlman, supra note 24, at 702 (explaining the FDA’s decision to limit 
research of silicone gel-filled implants to reconstructive purposes). Some 
concerns about silicone breast implants being associated with, for example, 
autoimmune disorders were ultimately not borne out. See, e.g., Bernstein, 
supra note 202, at 484; Dresser et al., supra note 7, at 743. The aesthetic 
indication for the saline breast implants also was limited to adults, whereas 
the indication for reconstruction was not, suggesting that the FDA may have 
weighed the two uses differently. See SUMMARY OF SAFETY AND EFFECTIVENESS 
DATA OF SALINE-FILLED MAMMARY PROSTHESIS, supra note 208, at 1 (listing 
indications for use). On the other hand, the differing indications may simply 
reflect the rarity with which reconstruction likely occurs in minors. 
 211. See Mehlman, supra note 24, at 702. 
 212. A search for “dermal filler” in the FDA’s PMA database yields 
sixty-four approved applications. Premarket Approval (PMA) Database, supra 
note 204.   
 213. See, e.g., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., RESTYLANE LABELING 1 (2016), 
https://perma.cc/A9UY-4NJD (PDF); Dermal Fillers Approved by the Center 
for Devices and Radiological Health, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://
perma.cc/9S6H-XK82 (last updated Aug. 29, 2018).  
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because they work primarily through physically filling the skin 
rather than through chemical action.214   
Like many non-therapeutic uses of drugs, the FDA 
determined that at least some dermal fillers are effective based 
on clinical trials assessing both researchers’ and subjects’ own 
judgments that the dermal fillers had reduced the appearance 
of wrinkles.215 Also like both breast implants and 
non-therapeutic uses of drugs, dermal fillers are not risk-free. 
The most common adverse events are relatively minor, 
including bruising, pain, and redness.216 They, however, also are 
associated with serious risks, such as necrosis and anaphylactic 
shock, as well as aesthetic adverse effects, such as movement of 
the filler or the formation of permanent, hard nodules on the 
skin.217 Consistent with these risks, the FDA restricts dermal 
fillers to prescription use.218  
Moreover, the FDA’s approval decisions for dermal fillers 
provide some evidence the FDA also judges the risks and 
benefits of different non-therapeutic uses differently. For 
example, the FDA first approved a permanent, rather than a 
temporary, dermal filler in 2006 only for one non-therapeutic 
use in patients over twenty-one years of age—nasolabial folds 
(wrinkles on the side of the mouth that extend upward toward 
the nose)—but not for the other non-therapeutic uses for which 
temporary dermal fillers are approved, such as lip and cheek 
augmentation.219 Permanent dermal fillers pose similar risks to 
 
 214. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1), (h); see also Genus Med. Techs., LLC v. 
FDA, 427 F. Supp. 3d 74, 77 (D.D.C. 2019) (describing the drug and device 
definitions); Lars Noah, Growing Organs in the Lab: Tissue Engineers 
Confront Institutional “Immune” Responses, 55 JURIMETRICS J. 297, 314 n.93 
(2015) (“The FDA regulates some injectable products as medical devices.” 
(citation omitted)).  
 215. See, e.g., RESTYLANE LABELING, supra note 213, at 1. 
 216. See Dermal Fillers (Soft Tissue), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://
perma.cc/9CY5-JGD3 (last updated Nov. 26, 2018).  
 217. See id.  
 218. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., RESTYLANE APPROVAL ORDER 1 (2016), 
https://perma.cc/ZFT7-9KS2 (PDF). 
 219. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., ARTEFILL LABELING 1 (2006), https://
perma.cc/2C9Q-3TRL (PDF); Dermal Fillers (Soft Tissue), supra note 216. 
Artefill, now marketed as Bellafill, is described as permanent because it is 
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temporary dermal fillers but, because of their permanence, 
certain adverse effects, such as lumps—or simply dissatisfaction 
with the results—are more difficult to address.220 In 2014, the 
FDA also approved an arguably-therapeutic use for the 
permanent dermal filler (filling acne scars in people over 
twenty-one years of age), underscoring the links between 
therapeutic and non-therapeutic uses and showing that 
therapeutic uses might sometimes follow non-therapeutic 
ones.221 
IV.  CONTEMPLATING THE FUTURE 
As a descriptive matter, the FDCA gives the FDA 
significant latitude to determine whether a particular product 
use is safe and effective, and FDA review of the safety and 
effectiveness of non-therapeutic uses has not proven to be an 
impossible impediment to their marketing. But that still leaves 
question of whether it should.222 This Part argues, first, that this 
question may become more salient, as changes in technology, 
law, and policy are poised to force the FDA to more frequently 
 
made of non-absorbable polymethylmethacrylate beads, rather than 
absorbable collagen or hyaluronic acid, and has been shown to last at least five 
years in clinical trials. ARTEFILL LABELING, supra, at 1. 
 220. See Dermal Fillers (Soft Tissue), supra note 216. 
 221. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., BELLAFILL LABELING 1 (2014), https://
perma.cc/5V6Y-TXGY (PDF); see also Joan Kron, This New Filler Is a Game 
Changer, ALLURE (Sept. 10, 2015), https://perma.cc/5WXK-FCTT (explaining 
how Bellafill works to fill smile lines and acne scars).  
 222. There may be relevant normative questions in addition to the 
question of whether the FDA should be willing to use its discretion to conclude 
that non-therapeutic uses are safe and effective, such as what kinds of 
information are appropriate for the FDA to consider in assessing benefits and 
risks. See, e.g., Konnoth, supra note 151, at 187. Moreover, there may be 
important practical questions about the FDA’s institutional norms and 
resources. For example, there may be questions about whether the FDA’s 
current scientific staff have the expertise to review the safety and effectiveness 
of recreational and enhancing non-therapeutic uses, with which the agency 
does not have the same amount of experience as it does with aesthetic uses. 
Cf. id. at 219 (addressing arguments that the FDA lacks expertise to address 
certain kinds of “side effects” of drugs). 
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confront its possible authority over not just aesthetic uses of 
drugs and devices, but also recreational or enhancing uses.223  
This Part then begins to explore the normative question of 
how the FDCA’s safety and effectiveness standard should be 
applied to non-therapeutic uses. It considers several of the 
purposes that FDA approval serves—an analysis that 
preliminarily suggests the agency could reasonably take various 
different approaches to assessing the safety and effectiveness of 
non-therapeutic uses. This, in turn, provides further support for 
the Article’s claim that arguments grounded in the idea that the 
FDCA’s safety and effectiveness standards would necessarily 
ban non-therapeutic uses will not be useful tools for determining 
the scope of FDA jurisdiction.  
A.  Beyond Aesthetic Uses 
Non-therapeutic uses of drugs and devices are nothing 
new.224 For centuries, humans have used caffeine and ginkgo 
biloba to improve energy, focus, or memory, equipment and 
chemical interventions to improve athletic performance, and 
numerous substances, such as cocaine and psychedelics, 
recreationally.225 As Part III shows, the FDA has long regulated 
aesthetic uses of drugs and devices.226 Against this background 
one might wonder why consider the FDA’s jurisdiction over 
non-therapeutic uses particularly at a time when the COVID-19 
pandemic is highlighting pressing questions about the agency’s 
application of its drug and device authorities to 
desperately-needed therapeutic uses during public health 
emergencies.227 But the time is, arguably, ripe to consider the 
 
 223. See, e.g., Patricia J. Zettler & Erika Lietzan, A Special Exception for 
CBD in Foods and Supplements?, 25 DRUG DISCOVERY TODAY 467, 467 (2020) 
(discussing the increased relevance of FDA jurisdiction over aspects of the 
cannabis industry). 
 224. See, e.g., Maxwell J. Mehlman, Cognition-Enhancing Drugs, 82 
MILBANK Q. 483, 484 (2004).  
 226.  See, e.g., id. 
 226. See supra Part III. 
 227. For a small selection of some recent scholarship discussing the FDA’s 
approach to drugs, vaccines, and devices intended to treat, prevent, or 
diagnose COVID-19, see Jerry Avorn & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Up Is Down—
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future of non-therapeutic uses because evolutions in technology, 
as well as in law and policy, appear poised to create markets of 
non-therapeutic uses that will more frequently intersect with 
the FDA’s drug and device powers.228  
For example, some hope that emerging technologies may 
prove to be better—safer or more effective—for non-therapeutic 
uses than existing technologies have been.229 At the same time, 
at least some novel non-therapeutic technologies may be 
challenging to legally market without FDA authorization. 
Human genome editing provides a dramatic example.230 After 
decades of work to develop gene therapies, newer techniques, 
such as CRISPR, have made genome editing easier and cheaper 
to carry out.231 Genetic interventions hold promise for both 
therapeutic and non-therapeutic uses. A genetic intervention 
that effectively builds muscle might treat patients with 
 
Pharmaceutical Industry Caution vs. Federal Acceleration of COVID-19 
Vaccine Approval, 383 NEJM 1706 (2020); Evans & Clayton, supra note 6; 
Ameet Sarpatwari et al., Missed Opportunities on Emergency Remdesivir Use, 
324 JAMA 331 (2020); Benjamin N. Rome & Jerry Avorn, Drug Evaluation 
During the COVID-19 Pandemic, 392 NEJM 2282 (2020); Parasidis et al., 
supra note 152; Yaniv Heled et al., Regulatory Reactivity: FDA and the 
Response to COVID-19, FOOD & DRUG L.J. (forthcoming 2021) (on file with 
author); Jacob S. Sherkow, Regulatory Sandboxes and the Public Health (in 
progress) (on file with author). 
 228. Cf. Taleed El-Sabawi, Why the DEA, Not the FDA? Revisiting the 
Regulation of Potentially-Addictive Substances, 16 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 317, 321 
(2020) (analyzing the history of FDA authority over “illicit sales of 
non-narcotic drugs, like barbiturates and amphetamines”); Max A. Cherney, 
Tilray Partners with Novartis in Big Pharma’s First Deal of its Kind with Big 
Marijuana, MARKETWATCH (Dec. 18, 2018, 10:16 AM), https://perma.cc/YF64-
5YDU (PDF) (describing Novartis’s partnership with a medical cannabis 
company). 
 229. Many FDA-regulated products that traditionally have been popular 
for non-therapeutic purposes have been ineffective or unsafe. For instance, a 
dietary supplement company conducted a study comparing the cognitive 
enhancing effects of coffee with that of its own so-called “nootropic” 
supplement—and found that coffee worked better than its own product. See 
Chrissy Farr, This Start-Up Raised Millions to Sell ‘Brain-Hacking’ Pills, but 
its Own Study Found Coffee Works Better, CNBC (Nov. 30, 2017, 4:02 PM), 
https://perma.cc/PQ56-53R6. 
 230. See NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., supra note 15, at 137.  
 231. See, e.g., Jacob S. Sherkow et al., Is It ‘Gene Therapy’? 5 J.L. & 
BIOSCIENCES 786, 789 (2018). 
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muscular dystrophy and be used for healthy individuals 
interested in enhancing physical performance.232 But this 
example of overlapping therapeutic and non-therapeutic uses is 
likely to be rare because “the specificity of edited cells will make 
[off-label] applications less likely” than for traditional drugs and 
devices—making any non-therapeutic uses more likely to be 
subject to the FDA’s premarket review requirements.233 
Moreover, because of the potential serious risks associated with 
genetic interventions, the FDA may be unlikely to decline to 
enforce premarket review requirements for such uses.234 
Perhaps more importantly, changes to the FDCA, as well as 
to other areas of law and policy, also may lead to 
non-therapeutic uses more frequently coming before the FDA. 
An example involving the FDCA comes from the 21st Century 
Cures Act of 2016.235 That law amended the FDCA to ease the 
development of new uses of already approved products—such as 
the use of Botox for wrinkles, when the drug was already 
approved for therapeutic uses.236 Specifically, the FDCA now 
permits the FDA to consider “real world evidence,” including 
“data . . . from sources other than randomized clinical trials,” 
such as from clinical practice,237  when evaluating new uses of 
already approved products.238 Manufacturers may be more 
likely to seek FDA approval of non-therapeutic drug uses if this 
provision enables approval of such uses without expensive 
clinical trials, but instead based on experience in clinical 
practice—such as the evidence that patients using Rogaine’s 
active ingredient for hypertension also experienced hair 
 
 232. See NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., supra note 15, at 9. 
 233. Id. at 152; see supra Part II.C (discussing the regulatory regime for 
off-label uses). 
 234. Cf. Information about Self-Administration of Gene Therapies, U.S. 
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Nov. 21, 2017), https://perma.cc/H6X4-55BR 
(cautioning consumers on the risks of do-it-yourself gene therapies). 
 235. Pub. L. No. 114-255 § 3022, 130 Stat. 1033 (2016). 
 236. See supra Part III.B.2. 
 237. 21 U.S.C. § 355g(b). 
 238. See 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255 § 3022, 130 Stat. 
1033; Jordan Paradise, 21st Century Citizen Pharma: The FDA & 
Patient-Focused Product Development, 44 AM. J.L. & MED. 309, 310 (2018). 
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growth.239 The 21st Century Cures Act also amended the FDCA 
to encourage the FDA to incorporate “patient experience data” 
into its evaluations, which may further ease the development of 
non-therapeutic uses for which patient self-assessments are 
important indicators of effectiveness.240  
Likewise, legal developments not directly tied to the FDA’s 
enabling statutes also may bring new non-therapeutic uses 
before the agency. Most notably, widespread state level 
cannabis decriminalization (or de facto decriminalization) has 
allowed quasi-legal markets to emerge.241 Both the FDA and the 
traditional pharmaceutical industry have paid increasing 
attention to cannabis products, albeit with a primary focus on 
therapeutic uses of such products.242 But particularly now that 
 
 239. See Rachel E. Sherman et al., Real-World Evidence—What Is It and 
What Can It Tell Us?, 375 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2293, 2296 (2016); Jonathan P. 
Jarow et al., Multidimensional Evidence Generation and FDA Regulatory 
Decision Making: Defining and Using “Real-World” Data, 318 J. AM. MED. 
ASS’N 703, 704 (2017); U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., USE OF REAL-WORLD 
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT REGULATORY DECISION-MAKING FOR MEDICAL DEVICES: 
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG STAFF 8 (2017), https://perma.cc
/8CWF-XB6D (PDF); U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS 
USING REAL-WORD DATA AND REAL-WORLD EVIDENCE TO FDA FOR DRUGS AND 
BIOLOGICS: DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY (2019), https://perma.cc/87AC-
6RD4 (PDF); see also Jenny Bryan, How Minoxidil Was Transformed From an 
Antihypertensive to Hair-Loss Drug, PHARM. J. (July 20, 2011), https://
perma.cc/V93D-5BQW (describing the active ingredient in Rogaine’s evolution 
from a hypertension treatment to a drug for hair growth); W. Nicholson Price 
II, Drug Approval in a Learning Health System, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2413, 2462 
(2018) (“[I]f FDA learns more about drugs based on how they work in the real 
world, that information should be used to address how drugs are labeled, sold, 
and used.”). On the other hand, if the FDA loosens its restrictions on off-label 
promotion—because of First Amendment jurisprudence or for other reasons—
manufacturers may have fewer incentives to seek FDA authorization of 
non-therapeutic uses for already-approved drugs and devices. See, e.g., FDA 
MEMO, supra note 21, at 1; Kapczynski, supra note 21, at 2359; see also 
Lietzan, supra note 162, at 171–83 (describing the process and incentives for 
developing new uses). 
 240. See Paradise, supra note 238, at 321–22. 
 241. See, e.g., Kamin, supra note 15, at 624; Robert A. Mikos, Marijuana 
Localism, 65 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 719, 767 (2015). 
 242. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CANNABIS AND CANNABIS-DERIVED 
COMPOUNDS: QUALITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR CLINICAL RESEARCH: GUIDANCE FOR 
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at least eleven states and the District of Columbia have 
decriminalized adult recreational use of cannabis,243 in the near 
future the FDA may face questions about its authority over 
recreational cannabis products.244 Indeed, as of the time of 
writing, the most recent federal bill to propose decriminalizing 
cannabis at the federal level expressly stated that it would not 
“affect or modify” the FDCA.245 
Questions about FDA jurisdiction over recreational uses of 
substances other than cannabis are likely to arise as well. Since 
2018, Ann Arbor, Denver, Oakland, Santa Cruz, and 
Washington, D.C. have established policies that effectively 
decriminalize certain uses of psychedelic substances, such as 
psilocybin.246 Additionally, in November 2020, Oregon voters 
passed one initiative that permits the therapeutic use of 
psilocybin under certain conditions and one that de facto 
decriminalizes possession small amounts of all drugs.247 In the 
 
INDUSTRY (2020), https://perma.cc/XD8T-L5XA (PDF); Cherney, supra note 
228; O’Connor & Lietzan, supra note 71, at 850. 
 243. Marijuana Overview, NAT’L CONF. ON STATE LEGISLATURES (Oct. 17, 
2019), https://perma.cc/V43T-FLRP. 
 244. Cf. O’Connor & Lietzan, supra note 71, at 902–03 (speculating how 
cannabis products intended for recreational use might be treated by the FDA).   
 245. Marijuana Opportunity Reinvestment and Expungement Act of 2020, 
H.R. 3884, 116th Cong., https://perma.cc/RD75-UXAS. 
 246. See Mason M. Marks, Controlled Substance Regulation for the 
Covid-19 Mental Health Crisis, 72 ADMIN. L. REV. 649, 654 (2020) (noting 
Denver, Oakland, Santa Cruz, and Washington, D.C’s de facto 
decriminalization policies); Ann Arbor Decriminalizes Magic Mushrooms, 
Psychegenic Plants, A.P. NEWS (Sept. 26, 2020), https://perma.cc/T22E-GCYM 
(PDF); see also Dustin Marlan, Beyond Cannabis: Psychedelic 
Decriminalization and Social Justice, 23 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 851, 872 
(2019) (“We are now beginning to see the decriminalization of psychedelics, 
namely psilocybin, at the state and municipal levels as well.”). 
 247. Oregon Measure 109, Psilocybin Mushroom Services Program 
Initiative (2020), BALLOTPEDIA, https://perma.cc/23L9-QMAW; Oregon 
Measure 110, Drug Decriminalization and Addiction Treatment Initiative 
(2020), BALLOTPEDIA, https://perma.cc/WZ6S-NAB2; see Cleve R. Wootson, Jr. 
& Jacyln Peiser, Oregon Decriminalizes Possession of Hard Drugs, As Four 
Other States Legalize Recreational Marijuana, WASH. POST (Nov. 4, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/PS9L-UU8R (“Oregon voters approved a controversial ballot 
measure decriminalizing possession of small amounts of so-called hard drugs, 
including cocaine, heroin, oxycodone and methamphetamines.”). 
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wake of these changes, some are predicting the psychedelic 
market will explode, which, in turn, could raise questions about 
FDA jurisdiction over recreational uses of these substances.248  
B.  Considering the Purposes of Safety and Effectiveness 
Review 
If technological, legal, and policy developments do in fact 
give rise to more, or new, non-therapeutic uses that potentially 
intersect with FDA jurisdiction, the FDA will be faced with both 
a legal question about whether it can regulate such technologies 
under its drug and device authorities, and also, if it can, how it 
should apply the statutory standards for safety and 
effectiveness to such uses. To begin to examine that question, 
this section considers three of the public health purposes the 
FDA’s premarket approval processes for drugs and devices are 
thought to serve: protecting people from unsafe and ineffective 
products, addressing information asymmetries between people 
and manufacturers, and incentivizing the development of 
socially valuable information.249 This analysis suggests that 
there are arguments that finding non-therapeutic uses to be 
safe and effective, or taking a flexible approach to such 
assessments, may be a normatively permissible approach for the 
agency.250 
 
 248. See North American Psychedelic Drugs Market Could Exceed $6.8 
Billion by 2021, FIN. NEWS MEDIA (Jan. 6, 2021), https://perma.cc/7GVK-
Y4WG. 
 249. See, e.g., FDA Memo, supra note 21; Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA 
in Innovation Policy, supra note 21, at 361; Kapczynksi, supra note 21, at 2360; 
Ariel Katz, Pharmaceutical Lemons: Innovation and Regulation in the Drug 
Industry, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 13 (2007); cf. President John 
F. Kennedy, Special Message to the Congress on Protecting the Consumer 
Interest (Mar. 15, 1962), https://perma.cc/2WJS-QP7R (describing four 
consumer rights: the right to safety, the right to be informed, the right to 
choose, and the right to be heard). 
 250. To be clear, this Article does intend to affirmatively argue that any 
safety and effectiveness determinations for specific products were correct (or 
incorrect), nor that the overall approach that the FDA has seemingly adopted 
for assessing the benefits and risks of aesthetic uses is the best one. Instead, 
this Part aims to show that the range of approaches the agency could 
reasonably take to assess the safety and effectiveness of non-therapeutic uses 
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1.  Protecting People from Unsafe and Ineffective Products 
The traditional rationale for requiring the FDA’s premarket 
review of drug and device safety and effectiveness is protecting 
people from unsafe and ineffective products.251 Considering this 
purpose, Rachel Sachs has explained that one way to 
conceptualize the FDA’s task is that, in implementing its 
premarket approval processes, the FDA must balance the risk 
of making Type I errors—in which the agency authorizes an 
unsafe or ineffective use of a drug or device—against the risk of 
making Type II errors—in which the agency fails to authorize a 
safe and effective use of a drug or device.252 Making too many 
Type I errors will subject patients and consumers to harmful 
uses of products and undermine public trust in the agency.253 
Making too many Type II errors would deny patients access to 
often desperately needed therapies.254  And there have long been 
differing views about whether the FDA generally is striking the 
right balance between Type I and Type II errors for therapeutic 
uses.255 Some have argued that the FDA may set the bar for 
demonstrating safety and effectiveness too low,256 while others, 
for example, have argued for open access to therapeutic uses on 
the ground that patients have a protected liberty interest in 
 
is at least arguably broad. This is in turn provides additional evidence against 
arguments that the FDCA would categorically preclude the agency from 
finding non-therapeutic uses safe and effective. 
 251. See, e.g., Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, supra 
note 21, at 345.   
 252. See, e.g., Rachel E. Sachs, Delinking Reimbursement, 102 MINN. L. 
REV. 2307, 2323–24 (2018). 
 253. See id. at 2323. 
 254. See id. at 2324. 
 255. See, e.g., Robert Kemp & Vinay Prasad, Surrogate Endpoints in 
Oncology: When Are They Acceptable for Regulatory and Clinical Decisions, 
and Are They Currently Overused? 15 BMC MED., NO. 15, 2017, at 5; Nicholas 
S. Downing et al., Clinical Trial Evidence Supporting FDA Approval of Novel 
Therapeutics, 2005–2012, 311 JAMA 368, 372–73 (2014); C. Frederick Beckner, 
III, Note, The FDA’s War on Drugs, 82 GEO. L.J. 529, 531 (1993).  
 256. See, e.g., Kemp & Prasad, supra note 257, at 5. 
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accessing medical interventions regardless of whether the FDA 
has authorized their use (albeit without success in the courts).257 
Similarly, the question of how to strike the balance between 
Type I and Type II errors in the context of non-therapeutic uses 
might lend itself to differing views. Arguably, avoiding Type I 
errors is more important for non-therapeutic than therapeutic 
uses.258 Under this view, because the benefits of a 
non-therapeutic use are inherently less than those of a 
therapeutic use, the risks of a non-therapeutic use should be 
quite low, or the benefits quite high (or both), for the FDA to 
determine that the use has a favorable benefit-risk balance.259 
That is, the FDA should err on the side of protecting consumers 
from risky and ineffective non-therapeutic uses, particularly 
where consumers do not have the same strong interest in access 
that terminally and seriously ill patients do.260 This might lead 
the FDA, for example, to refuse to approve Botox and dermal 
fillers for aesthetic uses because of the risk of death associated 
with both—even if rare.261 
By contrast, minimizing Type I errors might be less 
important, or at least no more important, for non-therapeutic 
than for therapeutic uses.262 For therapeutic uses, patients may 
not have much choice as to whether to use a particular drug or 
 
 257. See Abigail All. for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von 
Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 711 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc) (finding no protected 
liberty interest to use experimental drugs); see also Seema Shah & Patricia 
Zettler, From a Constitutional Right to a Policy of Exceptions: Abigail Alliance 
and the Future of Access to Experimental Therapy, 10 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, 
L., & ETHICS 135, 141 (2010) (analyzing the Abigail Alliance decision). 
 258. Cf. supra Part III.B.3 (describing the FDA’s differing evaluations of 
therapeutic and non-therapeutic uses of silicone breast implants). 
 259. See Legitimate Medicine, supra note 25, at 442. 
 260. Cf. Leah Isakov et al., Is the FDA Too Conservative or Too Aggressive? 
A Bayesian Decision Analysis of Clinical Trial Design, 211 J. ECONOMETRICS 
117, 128 (2019) (positing that traditionally accepted proportions of Type I error 
are too conservative for drugs treating terminal illnesses, but too large in other 
instances). 
 261. See supra Part III.  
 262. Cf. What Lies Ahead, supra note 22, at 321 (raising this argument as 
a possibility). The analysis in Part III suggests this view might be more 
consistent with the approach the FDA has actually adopted for assessing 
safety and effectiveness of aesthetic uses.  
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device as a practical matter—there may be only one therapy for 
their disease or condition, or their choice may be dictated by 
their physician’s or insurer’s views.263 Thus, patients might 
merit a high level of protection from dangerous or ineffective 
therapies that, in essence, their disease or condition would force 
them to take (and that the health care system would be forced 
to pay for).264 Consumers, on the other hand, who voluntarily 
engage in non-therapeutic uses may be in need of less protection 
(assuming a free choice, including a non-addictive product).265 
Consistent with this idea, numerous kinds of consumer products 
outside of the FDA’s jurisdiction—including those that can 
cause grave harm—may be marketed without a premarket 
review process.266 Accordingly, once some minimal threshold of 
safety and effectiveness is cleared, perhaps consumers should 
be able to choose to use non-therapeutic technologies, like hair 
 
 263. Cf. Pauline Bartolone, Behind the EpiPen Monopoly: Lobbying 
Muscle, Flailing Competition, Tragic Deaths, KHN (Sept. 8, 2016), https://
perma.cc/4H7A-AYKR (discussing a period when there was no alternative to 
Mylan’s EpiPen for treating anaphylactic shock). 
 264. See Scott Gottlieb, Comm’r, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Speech: 
Capturing the Benefits of Competition for Patients (Mar. 7, 2018), https://
perma.cc/A7RW-5EFK (“Is a patient really in a position to make an 
economically-based decision? . . . Of course not.”); see also Sachs, supra note 
252, at 2309 (“In the United States, federal law requires Medicare and 
Medicaid to cover most, and in many cases all, FDA-approved drugs.”). 
 265. See What Lies Ahead, supra note 22, at 322 (suggesting that 
consumers need less protection). The assumption of a free choice may only 
rarely be a fair one. Some of the social or ethical concerns about 
non-therapeutic uses involve the idea that consumers will not be able to freely 
chose to engage in or decline such uses. For example, some have argued that 
consumers will not or do not freely choose aesthetic changes or enhancement, 
but instead opt to alter their appearance or enhance performance because of 
societal pressure to do so. See, e.g., Nicholas S. Fitz et al., Public Attitudes 
Toward Cognitive Enhancement, 7 NEUROETHICS 173, 178 (2013).  
 266. Cf. Noah, supra note 14, at 5–9 (considering the possibility of FDA 
regulation of firearms, given the “ceaseless casualties” associated with them); 
Peter Yankowski, Police: Newtown Man Killed in Saw Accident While Clearing 
Tree, NEWSTIMES, https://perma.cc/6HRH-VFPL (last updated Aug. 7, 2020, 
10:23AM) (documenting the tragic death of a man who accidentally killed 
himself with a saw). 
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growth drugs, cognitive enhancements, and recreational 
cannabis, so long as they are informed of the relevant risks.267  
Similarly, minimizing Type II errors may be either more (or 
equally) important, or less important, for non-therapeutic uses 
as for therapeutic ones. There is a long-standing, and strongly 
held belief among some in the United States that people have a 
right to choose potentially therapeutic interventions without 
government interference.268 A belief in such freedom of choice 
may apply more forcefully for non-therapeutic uses, where 
justifications for robust FDA gatekeeping may not persuade 
even some who endorse the agency’s role in the context of 
therapeutic uses.269 This, in turn, would suggest that avoiding 
Type II errors is equally, if not more, important for 
non-therapeutic uses compared to therapeutic ones.  
Conversely, virtually all stakeholders agree that safe and 
effective therapies for patients, and particularly terminally and 
seriously ill patients, should reach the market as quickly as 
possible.270 The disagreement lies primarily in how much and 
what kinds of evidence are needed before such products are 
 
  267. There also may be pragmatic reasons for the FDA to be less concerned 
about Type I errors for non-therapeutic uses than for therapeutic uses. For 
example, agencies might elect to regulate cautiously or not at all to “avoid 
backlash and to preserve their own political capital.” That is, rather than 
interpret the FDCA’s safety and effectiveness standards as setting a high bar 
for non-therapeutic uses, the FDA might want to preserve political capital for 
fights other important public health matters. Sharon B. Jacobs, The 
Administrative State’s Passive Virtues, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 565, 623 (2014); cf. 
William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of 
Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1, 4 (2003) (discussing issues of government 
regulation generally). 
 268. See Lewis A. Grossman, The Origins of American Health 
Libertarianism, 13 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 76, 80 (2013) 
(“[S]truggles for freedom of therapeutic choice have recurred throughout 
American history.”). 
 269. Cf. L.O. Gostin & K.G. Gostin, A Broader Liberty: JS Mill, 
Paternalism and the Public’s Health, 123 PUB. HEALTH 214, 216–19 (2009) 
(describing some paternalistic justifications for public health regulations). 
 270. Cf. Shah & Zettler, supra note 257, at 195–96 (asserting that 
terminally and seriously ill patients can have compelling claims for accessing 
unapproved drugs while arguing against widespread access outside clinical 
trials). 
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marketed (i.e., in how to operationalize “safe and effective” and 
“as quickly as possible”).271 But the same likely cannot be said 
of denying or delaying access to non-therapeutic uses, like 
aesthetic breast implants. Such a denial or a delay might be in 
tension with principles of individual autonomy. But it would not 
cause death, worsening of illness, or other tangible physical 
harm to a person. Moreover, limiting access to non-therapeutic 
uses may not as easily give rise to the arguments rooted in 
individual liberty interests that terminally ill patients have 
asserted when seeking access to experimental interventions for 
therapeutic purposes.272 Thus, considering various views on 
minimizing Type I or Type II errors for non-therapeutic uses, 
demonstrates that the FDA arguably would be justified in 
adopting varied approaches to assessing such uses’ safety and 
effectiveness. 
2.  Addressing Information Asymmetries 
Another purpose that the FDA’s premarket approval 
processes can serve is addressing information asymmetries 
between people and manufacturers.273 Drugs and devices are 
described as “credence goods,” meaning their safety, 
 
 271. See articles cited supra note 255 (citing differing opinions on the 
appropriate level of evidence needed before FDA approval). 
 272. Cf. Shah & Zettler, supra note 257, at 141 (examining the argument 
that terminally and seriously ill patients have a liberty interest accessing 
experimental interventions). If certain non-therapeutic uses, and in particular 
enhancing uses, become widespread such that they create a “new normal,” 
problems of access may become more important. For example, if only wealthy 
individuals can access highly effective cognitive enhancers, that could reify or 
exacerbate societal inequalities. See Anita L. Allen & Nicolle K. Strand, 
Cognitive Enhancement and Beyond: Recommendations from the Bioethics 
Commission, 19 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 549, 551 (2015). Such access problems, 
however, typically are not about the initial question of FDA authorization 
based on safety and effectiveness—but on how technologies are distributed 
once demonstrated safe and effective. Cf. Development & Approval Process | 
Drugs, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://perma.cc/BR2X-X5FK (last updated 
Oct. 28, 2019) (outlining the FDA drug approval process and making no 
assertions about drug accessibility or price). 
 273. See HENRY G. GRABOWSKI & JOHN M. VERNON, THE REGULATION OF 
PHARMACEUTICALS 7 (1983); Katz, supra note 249, at 13–17; Kapczynski, supra 
note 21, at 2358. 
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effectiveness, and quality cannot be readily and easily evaluated 
by the people using them.274 For example, patients can recover 
from many diseases and conditions without treatment—if a 
patient with symptomatic COVID-19 takes a drug to treat the 
condition and then recovers, they, cannot, individually 
determine whether the recovery is due to the drug or because 
they were among those who would recover from COVID-19 
without the drug. The FDA’s premarket review of drug and 
device safety and effectiveness, thus, “protect[s] the 
misinformed [or uninformed] consumer from better-informed 
sellers.”275 As with protecting consumers from unsafe and 
ineffective products, considering the FDA’s role in addressing 
information asymmetries suggests that the agency reasonably 
could adopt various approaches in implementing its premarket 
approval requirements for non-therapeutic uses.  
Information asymmetries may not be as pronounced for 
certain non-therapeutic uses as they are for therapeutic uses. 
For example, people may be well-equipped to decide drugs and 
devices are effective for aesthetic uses.276 Consistent with this 
idea, the FDA has relied on users’ own assessments as a primary 
indicator of effectiveness for hair growth drugs, Botox, and 
dermal fillers.277 Recreational uses of drugs or devices—if the 
user’s goal is to have some fun—likewise may be readily 
evaluable by users.278  
Yet not all non-therapeutic uses, or aspects of therapeutic 
uses, are amenable to user self-assessment. Unlike aesthetic 
and recreational uses, users may have difficulty assessing the 
 
 274. See Katz, supra note 249, at 13. 
 275. Id. at 8. 
 276. Cf. Cierra Miller, I’m 22 Years Old & I Love Botox—Don’t Judge Until 
You See My Photos, STYLECASTER (Dec. 13, 2019, 5:53 PM), https://perma.cc
/DP5Y-8GRP (providing a woman’s thoughts on her Botox outcome). 
 277. See supra Part III.B. 
 278. Cf. Product Reviews by Customers, MAGIC MUSHROOMS DISPENSARY, 
https://perma.cc/L5RM-DNAL (displaying customer comments on magic 
mushroom and psychedelic experiences). 
 
444 78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 379 (2021) 
 
effectiveness of enhancing uses.279 As one example, some studies 
have suggested that Ritalin and Adderall—which are commonly 
believed to be effective cognitive enhancers—have only small 
effects on performance, and only in certain groups.280 
Nevertheless, these drugs remain widely used for enhancement, 
possibly because people cannot assess drugs’ cognitive 
enhancing effects very well themselves.281 Moreover, the risks of 
non-therapeutic uses of drugs and devices are generally similar 
to those of therapeutic uses.282 Accordingly, even if users can 
evaluate benefits for themselves, users may not be able to 
anticipate and assess risks of non-therapeutic uses, just as 
patients cannot anticipate and assess the risks of therapeutic 
uses.283  
3.  Incentivizing Information Production 
A third example of a purpose of the FDA’s premarket review 
of drug and device safety and effectiveness is incentivizing the 
development of societally valuable information about the 
products. As Rebecca Eisenberg has explained, FDA approval 
processes solve an information production problem by requiring 
manufacturers to develop rigorous evidence sufficient for the 
agency to assess the merits of their products.284 Without an FDA 
 
 279. See, e.g., Shaheen E. Lakhan & Annette Kirchgessner, Prescription 
Stimulants in Individuals with and Without Attention Deficit Hyperactivity 
Disorder, 2 BRAIN & BEHAV. 661, 670 (2012). 
 280. See id. at 669–70 (surveying the results of multiple studies). 
 281. Cf. id. (describing widespread use of ADHD drugs for academic 
performance enhancement). 
 282. See supra Part III.B. 
 283. Cf. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (“To the 
physician, whose training enables a self-satisfying evaluation, the answer may 
seem clear . . . [t]o enable the patient to chart his course understandably, some 
familiarity with the therapeutic alternatives and their hazards becomes 
essential.”). 
 284. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, supra note 21, 
at 370; see FDA MEMO, supra note 21, at 4; Kapczynski, supra note 21, at 2358; 
see also Cortez et al., supra note 88, at 376 (“[T]he true challenge, however, is 
creating a regulatory framework that encourages high-value innovation while 
also preventing the market from being overcome with products that are 
ineffective or unsafe.”). 
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approval requirement, drug and device manufacturers might 
not spend the time and money to conduct the rigorous research 
needed to produce this kind of information.285 Producing useful 
information about drugs and devices, in turn, helps to encourage 
high-value innovation—the development of new products for 
which there is good evidence that they do what their sellers 
claim.286 As former FDA Commissioner Margaret Hamburg 
said, “innovation doesn’t matter if the product doesn’t work.”287  
Again, considering this purpose of FDA review of safety and 
effectiveness might suggest that there is more than one 
perspective on premarket approval requirements for 
non-therapeutic uses. One the one hand, producing rigorous 
scientific evidence about non-therapeutic uses may simply be 
less important than it is for therapeutic uses. For example, it 
may not a societal priority to incentivize the creation of 
innovative wrinkle-eliminating drugs that are superior to 
Botox. Notably, the FDCA carves out from the drug and device 
definitions—and thus the FDA’s drug and device approval 
standards—certain non-therapeutic uses through, for example, 
separately defining dietary supplements.288 
 On the other hand, incentivizing information production 
could be highly valuable for non-therapeutic uses. Requiring the 
production of rigorous information about the actual effects of 
novel non-therapeutic uses may necessary for realizing hopes 
that these technologies will be better than what has come before 
(or at least for understanding whether any such hopes have 
been realized).289 For instance, a highly effective and safe 
 
 285. See Kapczynski, supra note 21, at 2358. Retaining incentives to 
produce information about the effects of drugs and devices is one reason that 
FDA policies generally prohibit manufacturers from promoting off-label 
uses—if permitted to promote those uses without FDA authorization, 
manufacturers would lack not study them. See id. at 2366–67; FDA MEMO, 
supra note 21, at 11–14. 
 286. See, e.g., Katz, supra note 249, at 12. 
 287. Toni Clarke, In Swansong, FDA Chief Defends Drug Approval 
Process, REUTERS (Mar. 27, 2015, 8:25 PM), https://perma.cc/4HE5-TGVY.  
 288. See supra Part II.A. 
 289. Cf. Allen & Strand, supra note 272, at 551 (advocating for thorough 
vetting of non-therapeutic technologies so that society can evaluate them with 
accurate information about the extent of their benefits). 
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cognitive enhancement technology could be revolutionary in 
what it allows individuals, and society at large, to accomplish.290 
Likewise, because humans have long engaged in using 
substances for recreation and seem unlikely to stop anytime 
soon, a product with a relatively safe, non-addictive, 
recreational use could provide a significant public health 
benefit. But without the scientific evidence necessary to assess 
the effects of such non-therapeutic uses, it would be difficult, if 
not impossible, to determine whether claims of enhancement or 
safety are supported, and challenging to predict the public 
health impacts of such uses.  
Additionally, although the FDA is not authorized to decide 
social and moral questions about non-therapeutic uses,291 
scientific evidence about the safety and effectiveness of 
non-therapeutic uses might be necessary for individuals, or 
society, to answer those questions. As an example, widespread 
use of cognitive enhancement technologies known to have very 
low risks might pose different social questions than if such 
technologies were associated with high risks or a high level of 
uncertainty about their risks. Similarly, technologies that 
effectively, but reversibly or temporarily, enhance cognitive 
capabilities might raise different issues than technologies that 
permanently change cognitive abilities.  
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inevitably involve social considerations. See, e.g., Lisa Heinzerling, The FDA’s 
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For those non-therapeutic uses that the FDA has approved, 
even if the FDA’s ultimate approval decision may have been 
flawed—for example, if one disagrees with the conclusion that 
the benefits of Botox for facial wrinkles outweigh its risks—
there is at least evidence on which to assess the risks and 
benefits of those uses.292 The same cannot be said for 
non-therapeutic uses that have not been subject to premarket 
review requirements.293 The information production purpose of 
the FDCA’s premarket approval provisions, thus, suggests there 
may be value in FDA review of non-therapeutic uses—
regardless of how the FDA interprets the flexible statutory 
standards for safety and effectiveness.  
CONCLUSION 
The broadly-written drug and device definitions in the 
FDCA potentially subject to FDA oversight numerous 
non-therapeutic uses of drugs and devices, from wrinkle 
removers to cognitive enhancements to recreational cannabis. 
Although commonsense limits on the drug and device 
definitions are needed, this Article critiques one limit that is 
sometimes offered: the FDA cannot regulate non-therapeutic 
uses because it is impossible for those uses to meet the FDCA’s 
safety and effectiveness standards for premarket authorization. 
This position will only rarely be descriptively correct, and it may 
not be normatively correct.294 The agency has been willing to 
conclude that the benefits of non-therapeutic uses outweigh 
their risks even when they are associated with small benefits, 
serious risks, or both—and this approach is, at least arguably, 
a reasonable one.295 Better understanding the potential scope of 
the FDA’s jurisdiction over non-therapeutic uses, and how the 
FDA assesses the safety and effectiveness of such uses, is 
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supplements). 
 294. See supra Part IV.B. 
 295. See supra Parts III.B, IV.B. 
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increasingly important as technological, legal, and policy 
developments are poised to create new markets of such uses. 
 
 
